Showing posts with label Charlottesville Attorney. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Charlottesville Attorney. Show all posts

Tuesday, July 03, 2012

Mandatory Minimum Sentence For Sex Movies

Mandatory Minimum Sentence for Sex Movies


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By Deborah Elkins
Published: July 3, 2012
Tags: 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, Criminal, Judge Paul V. Niemeyer

A defendant convicted of receipt of movies depicting female minors in sexual acts cannot overturn his 15-year mandatory minimum sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(1) with a claim that the trial court misinterpreted his earlier conviction for possession of obscene items involving children under Va. Code § 18.2-374.1(B)(2).

Defendant argues his 1984 conviction under the Virginia statute does not qualify as a predicate offense under § 2252A(b)(1) because the conviction did not, when considered under the categorical approach, relate to sexual abuse involving a minor. He contends that under the categorical approach, a sentencing court must take the most benign conduct that could support a conviction. According to defendant, because the Virginia statute arguably covers innocuous depictions of nudity, he could not be subject to a sentencing enhancement requiring a conviction that categorically relates to sexual abuse of a minor, as required by the federal enhancement statute.

We conclude defendant misreads the requirements for a conviction under Va. Code § 18.2-374.1 and reads too narrowly the scope of convictions that can serve as predicate offenses under § 2252A(b)(1).

Under the categorical approach, we do not delve into the facts of the prior conviction but generally look only to the fact of the conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense. Under Shepard v. U.S., 544 U.S. 13 (2005), however, the categorical approach has an exception which allows review of other documents involved in the prior conviction that might reveal the facts on which the conviction necessarily rested. But in the present case, all the court records of defendant’s prior conviction had been destroyed due to the age of the conviction, and thus the government presented no documents acceptable under Shepard that would allow consideration of the specific conduct that led to defendant’s conviction. We therefore look in this case only to the statutory definition of the state crime and the fact of conviction to determine whether the conduct criminalized by the statute, including the most innocent conduct, qualifies as an offense “relating to” the predicate offenses listed in 18 U.S.C. § 2242A(b)(1).

The hypothetical convictions postulated by defendant involving “innocent” or “innocuous” nude pictures of a minor are thus impossible under the Virginia courts’ interpretation of the statute. Innocuous exhibitions of nudity do not violate § 18.2-374.1 because they are not “lewd exhibitions” and thus do not constitute the “sexually explicit visual materials” targeted by the Virginia statute.

Moreover, 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(1) does not require that the predicate conviction amount to “sexual abuse” or “abusive sexual conduct involving a minor.” Rather, a conviction qualifies as a predicate conviction merely if it relates to sexual abuse or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or, indeed, even to child pornography. We have little difficulty concluding that defendant’s 1984 conviction for producing or making or attempting to prepare, produce or make sexually explicit visual material that uses or has as a subject a person less than 18 years old, under Virginia law, stands in some relation to, pertains to, concerns or has a connection with the sexual abuse of children, as well as the production of child pornography.

Judgment affirmed.


U.S. v. Colson (Niemeyer) No. 11-4709, June 25, 2012; USDC at Newport News, Va. (Davis) Patrick L. Bryant, FPD, for appellant; Elizabeth M. Yusi, AUSA, for appellee. VLW 012-2-138, 9 pp.

Interesting article.  Please contact us if you need legal advice.

Tucker Griffin Barnes
Charlottesville, VA (434-973-7474)
Inquire@TGBlaw.com
http://www.tgblaw.com/




Friday, June 29, 2012

And Ringo was his name-O

Sean Sowards was cruising along Interstate 77 in western North Carolina one day, heading home to Ohio after visiting Atlanta. Probably had some good tunes going.

He was pushing the speed limit just a little, which was 70 mph for that stretch of highway.

Sowards passed an area where Deputy James Elliott was waiting, a bear in the grass. He had placed his car at an angle that purposely prevented him from using his radar system.

Elliott watched Sowards go by and said to himself, that car is going 75 in a 70 zone. Cue the flashing blue lights. Elliott pulled Sowards’ car over.

The officer asked who owned the car. Sowards said his girlfriend, Deanna, but he didn’t really know her last name. A records check, however, showed the owner lived in Georgia.

Sowards started sweating profusely. He had a pre-paid cell phone, the officer noticed, probably thinking to himself, hmm, potential drug runner.

With Elliott was his faithful drug dog, Ringo. Elliott asked Ringo to sniff the outside of the car.

After getting a whiff outside the trunk, Ringo barked, “Bingo!”

Inside, Elliott found laundry detergent, often used to mask the scent of drugs, and, you guessed it, about 10 kilograms of cocaine. Sowards was busted and taken to jail, charged with possession.

Can a cop do that? Can he justify a car stop just because he looked at it and said, “Gee, that vehicle is travelling five mph over the speed limit”?

No, said a split panel of the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals last week. The case of U.S. v. Sowards (VLW 012-2-140) features a pretty testy back-and-forth between Judge James A.Wynn Jr., who wrote the opinion, and Chief Judge William B. Traxler Jr., who filed a 27-page dissent.

Elliott comes across as Barney Fife in Wynn’s view. Traxler makes him look like an officer-of-the-year candidate.

Wynn quoted several passages from the trial transcript that indicate that Elliott had some problems with distances. He said he watched Sowards’ car for about 100 yards until it passed him:

Q:[Government lawyer] And how many feet are in a hundred yards?

A: [Elliott]: There’s 12 feet in a yard.

Q: So 300 feet?

A: Correct.

OK, he wasn’t a math scholar. The judge wanted to push this line of inquiry further.

Q: [Judge]: Do you know what a yardstick is?

A: [Elliott]: Yes, sir.

Q: How many inches in a yardstick?

A: Well, on a yardstick there’s 12 inches. Well, it depends on the yard stick that … you have.

Defense counsel asked how he knew the car was going 75 in the 70 zone. Elliott responded, “My training and experience.”

Despite the math issues, the trial judge said the officer had probable cause to stop the car, based on his training to estimate speeds.

Hogwash, said Wynn, joined by Judge Roger L. Gregory. Elliott is trained only on how to run a radar unit, Wynn wrote. His training on estimation is education on how to guess. He guessed the car was speeding, and he did not use any of the accepted corroborating methods. He didn’t use his radar gun. He didn’t drive behind the suspect car and pace it with his own vehicle. Nothing more than eyeballing to support the stop. And that won’t do, they said.

The majority slammed home the point in a footnote: “The dissent has not cited – nor have we found – a single case issued by any court at any time, whether state or federal, finding probable cause exists to initiate a traffic stop for speeding on the sole basis of an officer’s unaided visual estimate that a vehicle was exceeding the speed limit by five mph or less.”

Cocaine suppressed. The court reversed the conviction and sent the case back to federal court in Statesville, N.C.

Traxler, in dissent, cited the 10 years of service Elliott had logged with the force and marched through the police course designed to train officers on estimation. And he pulled out all the facts that made Sowards look a bit sketchy. Sowards didn’t contest that he was speeding and he didn’t present any contradictory witnesses at the trial. Traxler would have affirmed.

Given the sharp tone of the discussion – which has been escalating in recent years in cases from the 4th Circuit – this one might be heard en banc.

As for Ringo, he missed his star turn. Sowards also was ready to fight the open-air dog sniff, claiming that Elliott lacked the necessary reasonable suspicion to deploy the pooch.

But the court said, we’re kicking the case on lack of probable cause and don’t need to consider the dog’s search.


Ringo will have to wait for another day.


About the author:  I’m Paul Fletcher, the publisher of Virginia Lawyers Weekly since, well, I celebrated my 21st year in this job in March.  Welcome to my Notebook.

Great article.  Please contact us if you need legal advice.

Tucker Griffin Barnes
Charlottesville, VA (434-973-7474)
Inquire@TGBlaw.com
http://www.tgblaw.com/





Thursday, June 28, 2012

No income means no award for widow

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No Income Means No Award for Widow

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By Deborah Elkins
Published: June 20, 2012
Tags: Judge Walter S. Felton Jr., Virginia Court of Appeals, Workers' Comp

A sole proprietor of a prefabricated home business did not take income in the two years prior to his death in a work-related auto accident, and his widow cannot collect a workers’ comp award based on a presumed 40-hour work week at the federal minimum wage; the Court of Appeals reverses the commission’s award.

Claimant, decedent’s widow, conceded that 2008 and 2009 joint federal income tax returns indicated the sole proprietorship operated at a loss and that it had continued to operate at a loss after decedent’s death. The carrier argues the commission erred by imputing to decedent an average weekly wage based on the federal minimum hourly wage in effect at the time of his accident as the evidence proved decedent had no wage earnings during the covered period.

The record lacks any evidence to support the commission’s finding that, were it not for his death, decedent, a sole proprietor, “would be earning” the federal minimum wage in effect at the time of his death, multiplied by a 40-hour work week. Claimant testified decedent paid himself fluctuating amounts from the draw account in the 52 weeks preceding his death and that the family business had continued to operate at a loss after decedent’s death.

We find no error in the commission’s determination that decedent’s weekly withdrawals from the draw account did not constitute wages under Va. Code § 65.2-101. This court has previously held that “wages” is a term applied to compensation paid to an employee as consideration for work, which constitutes a real economic gain for the employee.

A forensic accountant confirmed that the sole proprietorship operated at a net loss each week in the 52 weeks precedent decedent’s death and that decedent collected “no wages at all.” Under the circumstances here, where decedent’s weekly income consisted solely of borrowed funds, we cannot say such income constituted “earnings” for purposes of calculating his average weekly wage under Code § 65.2-101(1.b). The commission did not err in declining to calculate decedent’s average weekly wage based on the amount of his weekly draws.

The commission’s determination under Code § 65.2-101(1.b) that decedent would have earned $262 per week were it not for his death was without credible evidence to support it.

Award of benefits reversed and final judgment for the carrier.
Key Risk Ins. Co. v. Crews, Executrix (Felton) No. 2567-11-2, June 19, 2012; Workers’ Comp. Comm’n; Robert M. Himmel for appellant; Archibald Wallace III for appellee. VLW 012-7-184, 12 pp.

Good article.  Please contact us if you need legal assisstance.

Tucker Griffin Barnes
Charlottesville, VA (434-973-7474)
Inquire@TGBLaw.com
http://www.tgblaw.com/




Thursday, June 21, 2012

Prosecutor calls for investigatin of possible turkey abuse

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Bushnell seeks probe in turkey case

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PETA requested investigation of allegations
Wednesday, June 20, 2012
By BULLETIN STAFF REPORTS -

Henry County Commonwealth’s Attorney Bob Bushnell has asked the Virginia State Police to investigate allegations that turkeys were mistreated after a truck hauling 600 of the birds overturned last week near Ridgeway.

Bushnell made the request after receiving a letter Tuesday from People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA), a national animal rights organization. The letter alleges that turkeys were left in the overturned truck for hours after the Thursday morning wreck and were dying of heat exhaustion by the time employees of a company arrived to retrieve them.

The letter also alleges that witnesses reported seeing people jumping on live birds, throwing them against the side of a truck and striking their heads against cages, among other things. PETA alleges that “540 turkeys evidently suffered and died at the scene, possibly of heat-related stress.”

Bushnell said he was aware of the accident but had not been informed of any allegations of animal cruelty until he received PETA’s letter at midday Tuesday. By the end of the afternoon, he said, he had received about 50 emails and one phone call from people across the country who apparently learned of the allegations through PETA and wrote urging him to investigate.

An “action alert” about the incident is posted on PETA’s website, http://www.peta.org/.

“Unfortunately, I will not be able to personally speak with all the members of PETA (who wrote), but this has clearly touched a chord in the community that, like so many of us, love animals,” Bushnell said.

The wreck itself may have caused some turkeys to suffer, he said, adding that others “obviously suffered terribly” being trapped in the truck afterward. But Bushnell said he could not say that anyone violated the law by not releasing the birds, especially because doing so likely would have created a greater traffic hazard.

What he wants to determine through the investigation is if there is evidence of “provable, gratuitous cruelty to those turkeys for the sake of cruelty,” he said.

“I have asked the state police to speak to people who were there on the scene to find out whether anyone deliberately caused pain to the numerous turkeys that were involved,” he said.  “If the allegations, particularly the more lurid allegations, are borne out by evidence, we’ll give very, very serious thought to instituting charges,” he added.

Among those on the scene on U.S. 220 on Thursday, in addition to the state police, were Henry County animal control officers and several representatives of the Martinsville-Henry County SPCA, according to Bushnell and news media reports.

The state police said last week in a news release that the driver of the 1998 Peterbilt tractor-trailer, Lawrence Douglas Martin, 45, of Lumberton, N.C., was charged with reckless driving-failing to maintain control in connection with the accident. Martin was not injured in the wreck, according to state police reports at the time.

Interesting article. 
 
Tucker Griffin Barnes
Charlottesville, VA (434-973-7474)
Inquire@tgblaw.com
http://www.tgblaw.com/

Friday, June 15, 2012

No Continuance for Pro Se Husband

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No Continuance for Pro Se Husband

By Deborah Elkins
Published: June 11, 2012

Tags: Domestic Relations, Per Curiam Opinion, Virginia Court of Appeals

A divorce court did not err in denying husband a continuance, entering the final divorce decree as presented by wife’s counsel and awarding wife $960 in attorney’s fees, the Court of Appeals says.

Husband argues that as a pro se party, he should have been served with notice of the hearing to enter the final divorce decree. Husband initiated the legal process by filing the complaint for divorce, so he signed a pleading in the case. Wife’s counsel mailed a copy of the notice and motion of the entry of the final decree to husband at the mailing address that he provided. Pursuant to Va. Code § 20-99, wife’s counsel provided sufficient notice to husband of the upcoming hearing.

Husband contends Local Rule No. 4 applies in his situation; however, he did not present this argument to the trial court and it will not be considered on appeal. Husband presented no evidence that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his continuance request. The award of attorney’s fees was reasonable considering the circumstances of the case.

Bew v. Bew (Per Curiam) No. 2257-11-2, April 17, 2012; Hanover County Cir.Ct. (Harris) Robert M. Bew II, pro se; Robert L. Isaacs on brief for appellee. VLW 012-7-104(UP), 4 pp.

Interesting article.  Please let us know if you need legal advice.

Tucker Griffin Barnes
Charlottesville, VA (434-973-7474)
Inquire@TGBLaw.com
www.TGBLaw.com


Friday, June 08, 2012

School board emails were not "secret meeting"

Charlottesville attorneys

Va. Supreme Court rules Fairfax School Board e-mails did not break state law



The Virginia Supreme Court ruled Thursday that members of the Fairfax County School Board did not break state law when they exchanged hundreds of e-mails prior to a controversial 2010 vote to close Clifton Elementary School.

Clifton Elementary Final Day
The opinion, written by Senior Justice Lawrence L. Koontz, upheld a lower court’s ruling and affirmed a long-standing interpretation of how elected officials may and may not use e-mail to discuss public business.

Plaintiff Jill DeMello Hill, a Clifton parent who hoped to force a new vote on the school’s closure, had argued that board members’ e-mails constituted secret meetings that violated Virginia’s Freedom of Information Act.

A meeting — defined in the law to include any “informal assemblage” of three or more members of an elected body — must be formally announced and open to the public.

School Board members had been careful to avoid creating an “informal assemblage” as they considered whether to close Clifton Elementary. They limited themselves almost exclusively to one-on-one discussions, whether in person, on the phone or through e-mail.

But they had many such one-on-one discussions, one after another. Sometimes, a board member forwarded
e-mail chains to colleagues — sharing one-on-one discussions with a larger group.

Hill contended that the sheer volume of e-mails sent over two days — and the fact that at least one board member, James L. Raney (At Large), appeared to change his mind during those two days — constituted illegal conversation and cajoling by board members.

The Supreme Court disagreed. Broadcasting information to many board members at once, “whether directly, by carbon copy, or by forwarding,” was akin to sending an office memorandum, Koontz wrote.

The e-mails had not generated group conversation, he added, and lacked the “simultaneity” that legal precedent has established as the defining quality of an e-mail meeting.

The Supreme Court also upheld the lower court’s decision not to grant Hill’s request for reimbursement of attorneys’ fees and other costs.

Fairfax schools spokesman John Torre said in an e-mail that the school system was “pleased” with the court’s ruling. Hill could not be immediately reached for comment

 Interesting article.  Please contact us if you need legal advice.

Tucker Griffin Barnes
Charlottesville, VA (434-973-7474)
Inquire@TGBLaw.com
www.TGBLaw.com
www.Facebook.com/TuckerGriffinBarnes

Wednesday, June 06, 2012

Drug dog's reliability questioned

Charlottesville Criminal Defense Attorney

Drug-sniffing dog's accuracy questioned

The dog's 26 percent accuracy rate is too low to warrant a car search, a lawyer is arguing.

 

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Bono is a police dog with a nose for narcotics.

But how reliable is that nose? That was the question raised Tuesday in federal court during a hearing for Herbert Green, who was arrested last year after Bono indicated that he smelled cocaine inside his sport utility vehicle.

Green's lawyer is arguing that Bono has such a bad record — drugs were found just 22 times out of 85 "alerts" by the dog — that police had no probable cause to search the vehicle during a traffic stop on Interstate 81 in Wythe County.

"We should demand a better accuracy rate," assistant federal public defender Randy Cargill said in asking that the kilogram and a half of cocaine found in the back of Green's Lincoln Navigator be suppressed.

After hearing testimony and arguments in U.S. District Court in Roanoke, Judge Glen Conrad said he will issue a ruling later in writing.

In other cases that have challenged the reliability of drug-sniffing dogs, courts have not settled on a precise number at which a pooch's performance fails the smell test.

But with a success rate of just 26 percent, Bono fares much worse than his police dog peers cited in other court decisions.

Still, Assistant U.S. Attorney Ashley Neese defended the German shepherd's performance, noting that police dogs are trained to detect the odor of drugs — not their actual presence.

In some cases, she argued, the scent of cocaine or marijuana might linger in a vehicle after it has been removed, leading to a positive alert by the dog.

Prosecutors are urging Conrad to consider other factors, including Bono's high marks in training and certification programs run by the Virginia State Police, the agency that uses the dog.

In testimony Tuesday, Bono's handler, state Trooper Brian Dillon, did not dispute Cargill's calculations that drugs were seized just 26percent of the time that Bono alerted.

But he testified that variables such as wind and the possibility of well-hidden drugs in a car would affect the numbers cited by the defense.

"It's just a big game of hide-and-seek with the canine," Dillon said.

In the case at hand, Bono was summoned March17, 2011, after Green, 45, was stopped on suspicion of having illegally tinted windows and an obscured license plate while driving through Wythe County on the interstate.

As Bono circled the SUV, he "alerted" near the vehicle's rear passenger panel. When he smells drugs, "Bono gets excited, his tail starts wagging, his whole demeanor changes," Dillon testified.

After the dog let out a snort and pawed at the vehicle, state troopers began a search despite Green's objections. (Police are not required to obtain warrants to search cars, given their mobility and reduced expectation of privacy. They must, however, have probable cause.)

In a duffel bag, police found about 1.5kilograms of cocaine.

However, there would be little additional evidence against Green should the drugs be thrown out on the basis of Bono's track record.

In arguing that the evidence should be suppressed, Cargill pointed out that 74percent of the people who had their cars searched by the dog were never arrested.

"The whole purpose of this is to protect against unreasonable searches," he said.

Interesting article.  Please contact us if you need legal advice.

Tucker Griffin Barnes P.C.
Charlottesville, VA (434-973-7474)
Inquire@TGBLaw.com
www.TGBLaw.com
www.Facebook.com/TuckerGriffinBarnes

Monday, June 04, 2012

Dad can sue for unauthorized adoption

Charlotesville Family Law Attorneys

Dad can sue for unauthorized adoption

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April 23rd, 2012 · No Comments · Supreme Court of Virginia, Uncategorized

A Virginia father can seek damages from adoption lawyers and a Utah couple who adopted his child without his permission, a divided Supreme Court of Virginia said on April 20. A tort claim for “tortious interference with parental rights” is part of Virginia common law, the court said.

According to the father’s complaint, the mother misled him into thinking they would rear the child together, while she continued talking to lawyers about adoption, at the urging of her parents. The mother did not inform plaintiff when she went into labor early and when she delivered the child on Feb. 10, 2009. Although plaintiff John Wyatt III sued for custody in Virginia, Utah courts have awarded custody to the adoptive couple. Wyatt sued in a Virginia federal court, which certified questions to the Virginia high court.

The Virginia Supreme Court authorized Wyatt’s suit against Virginia lawyer Mark McDermott, Utah lawyer Larry Jenkins and the Act of Love agency and adoptive parents Thomas and Chandra Zarembinski.

“It is both astonishing and profoundly disturbing that in this case, a biological mother and her parents, with the aid of two licensed attorneys and an adoption agency, could intentionally act to prevent a biological father — who is in no way alleged to be an unfit parent — from legally establishing his parental rights and gaining custody of a child whom the mother did not want to keep, and that this father would have no recourse in the law,” wrote Justice LeRoy F. Millette Jr. for the court majority.

Justices William C. Mims, S. Bernard Goodwyn and Elizabeth McClanahan found no such common law right and dissented from the decision “legislating public policy in Virginia through judicial pronouncement,” in McClanahan’s words.

The opinion in Wyatt v. McDermott is VLW 012-6-078.

Other cases released April 20 are highlighted in the VLW SCoVA Blog.
– Deborah Elkins

Interesting article.  Please contact us if you need legal advice.

Tucker Griffin Barnes
Charlottesville, VA (434-973-7474)
Inquire@TGBLaw.com

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Friday, June 01, 2012

Basic estate and long-term planning a must for LGBT seniors

Charlottesville Attorneys

Basic estate and long-term planning a must for LGBT seniors


By Virginia Lawyers Weekly
Published: May 21, 2012
Tags: ,
 
Virginia does not recognize same-sex marriages or domestic partnerships, and also does not recognize the validity of same-sex marriages or domestic partnerships entered into in other states. As a result, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) population of Virginia has a critical need for estate and long-term care planning.

Without the proper planning, as health deteriorates with age, estranged family members may end up with decision making authority over an LGBT senior’s financial, health and final arrangements, in lieu of a life partner or a trusted friend. Without a will, relatives of an LGBT senior may inherit property that was intended to sustain a life partner during their golden years.

Even without the proper planning, heterosexual couples have protections built into our statutes. Marriage brings rights to inherit property if the decedent dies without a will. Marriage brings statutory decision making authority over a spouse’s health care. Marriage confers rights to receive notice of pending proceedings under our state’s guardianship and conservatorship statutes. Spouses may make funeral arrangements as “next of kin” of the decedent. Spouses have protection from their spouse’s creditors as to property that they own as tenants by the entirety. Finally, spouses are protected from impoverishment if their spouse needs Medicaid to pay for long-term care.

LGBT couples (as well as unmarried heterosexual couples) lack these statutory rights. There are no inheritance rights, no health care decision making authority, no requirement that the partner be notified of a hearing to declare their partner to be incapacitated, no authority to make funeral arrangements, and no safe harbor under Medicaid’s transfer regulations. LGBT seniors can, however, put documents in place to establish these rights. LGBT seniors must act affirmatively to put these documents in place before the onset of illness, incapacity or death, in order to avoid the risk of having their partners left out of the most sensitive decision making.

As we age, the odds increase that we will lose our ability to give informed consent, and that health care professionals will need to look to a surrogate for health care decision-making authority. Not infrequently, LGBT persons (and their partners) have troubled relationships with their families, which may be due in part to family members’ disapproval of the LGBT person’s sexual or gender orientation. In the event that the LGBT patient cannot give informed consent, an advance medical directive dictates that the LGBT’s partner or trusted friend makes sensitive health care decisions, not a hostile, estranged, or distant family member. In the absence of an advance medical directive, and if there is no court-appointed guardian, it is generally the immediate family who will make decisions regarding an LGBT senior’s heath care.

Advance medical directives frequently contain a “living will” (or “natural death declaration”) stating the person’s preferences regarding life support in the event of terminal illness or a persistent vegetative state. If one of these end-of-life situations presents itself, a “living will” reassures the agent named in the advance medical directive that they are making the decision that their loved one would want, and assures the family that the agent is acting in accordance with the patient’s wishes.

Another critical document for LGBT seniors is a designation of a person to make final arrangements. In the absence of such a designation, the decedent’s “next of kin” are the only people authorized to make funeral and burial arrangements. “Next of kin” is defined in our statutes as spouses and blood relatives. A life partner has absolutely no legal authority to provide burial instructions. If there is disagreement about what arrangements should be made, any of the “next of kin” may petition the court to determine who should have decision making authority; a partner would not likely have standing to bring such a suit. It is not enough for an LGBT senior to discuss their wishes regarding their final arrangements with their partner, friends and family. These wishes might not be honored, or worse may be disregarded. In the absence of a written designation of an agent to make final arrangements, partners are legally shut out of the decision making, and must depend on the family to include them in the plans.

A durable power of attorney is a third critical document for LGBT seniors. Nominating a person to handle some or all of one’s financial affairs in the event of incapacity can obviate the need for a court order appointing a conservator to manage one’s financial affairs. As noted above, there is no requirement that a partner be notified of any such court proceedings, unless the partner is an agent under the person’s written power of attorney or written advance medical directive.

There are no inheritance rights or family allowance rights under Virginia law for partners of LGBT decedents. Thus, it is extremely important for LGBT seniors work with a knowledgeable estate planning attorney to ensure that their assets are properly and efficiently distributed at their death. In the absence of proper planning, a LGBT decedent’s blood relatives could inherit the decedent’s property under Virginia’s intestacy statutes. Virtually all will forms available through self-help kits and web sites presume that all of the beneficiaries are legally related to the decedent, and are therefore less likely to have the proper outcome for a LGBT couple.

Lastly, LGBT seniors must act affirmatively regarding paying for their long-term care. Many seniors turn to Medicaid to afford the cost of a nursing home. Medicaid laws provide some protections against spousal impoverishment, and generally allow spouses to exchange property with each other, but offer no corresponding protections for same-sex partners. Long-term care insurance is especially prudent for LGBT seniors. The assistance of a knowledgeable elder law attorney may enable the LGBT couple to arrange their finances to support each other without running afoul of Medicaid’s gifting restrictions.

- By Ashley Payne, an associate with the firm of White & McCarthy in Midlothian.

Excellent article.  Please let us know if you need any legal advice.


Tucker Griffin Barnes P.C.
Charlottesville, VA (434-973-7474)
Inquire@TGBLaw.com


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Thursday, May 31, 2012

What should an attorney do when they notice their client has diminished capacity?

This article was written as advice to attorneys who notice their client has diminished capacity.  Although written for attorneys, we think it provides excellent insight into the problems many families are facing today.

When you notice your client has diminished capacity

By Virginia Lawyers Weekly
Published: May 17, 2012
Tags:
 
At some point in your practice you may be confronted by the diminished capacity of a client. With the American population aging, the number of individuals with diminished capacity is increasing. An attorney may be faced with a client in crisis because of diminished capacity and possibly challenged by one of the following scenarios:


Scenario 1

You have done the estate planning of a couple a few years ago, and then the wife comes to see you. She is concerned because her husband, who is suffering from dementia, has a new behavior of uncontrollable spending. The husband is continuously giving money or writing checks to whoever comes to their front door. The couple had executed a standard estate plan including last wills and testaments, healthcare powers of attorney, durable financial powers of attorney and revocable trusts. Now these documents may not be sufficient enough to protect the couple. In addition, you are faced with a conflict of interest since only the wife is coming to see you while you began the relationship as joint representation.

Scenario 2

The children of your client come to see you for a consultation, because they are concerned that their mom is being financially exploited by her housekeeper. Mom recently revoked the power of attorney designating the children as agents, and has signed a new power of attorney designating the housekeeper. What shall you do?
In both scenarios we are faced with a potential conflict of interest. In both, however, we can see the need to protect the client.

One possible solution in scenario 1 would be to have a meeting with both the wife and the husband to address the issues. This will give you an opportunity to assess whether the husband is capable of and willing to cooperate in taking steps to protect the couples’ assets. If all of the assets were titled in the revocable trust you will be able to recommend that the husband resign as trustee. In addition, you may wish to confirm there are no other assets outside of the trust that could fall under the control of a new agent, should the husband revoke the current power of attorney and create a new one. If these measures are not sufficient, the wife could petition for guardianship and conservatorship of her husband. However, since you also have a client-attorney relationship with the husband, you cannot represent the wife in this matter. This petition will require a doctor’s evaluation and opinion that the husband is not capable of making decisions about his personal and financial affairs. It will certainly be easy for the wife to contact the doctor because the husband should have signed a HIPAA release on her behalf.

For the second scenario (action of the children), it may be necessary to pursue a petition for guardianship and conservatorship of the mother, with an express provision to revoke the existing power of attorney.

Again, you have an existing attorney-client relationship with the mother, and representing the children would conflict with that relationship. However, if you determine that the circumstances meet the requirements of Rule 1.14 of the Rules of Professional Responsibility, you can be the petitioner in seeking the appointment of a guardian and conservator to protect your client. Unless the children have a release from mom, collecting a doctor’s evaluation report will be more difficult in this case. It is not certain that the mom has executed a HIPAA release and/or the children may not have access to their mother’s doctor. The best solution would be for the children to become more involved in their mother’s healthcare. They will need to accompany their mother to her doctor’s appointment and to try to have her execute a HIPAA release. The children will have to outline their concerns with their mother’s doctor and ask that the doctor conduct an evaluation. If this is not possible, a petition for guardianship can be filed together with a motion for the court to order a doctor’s evaluation. In addition, the court-appointed guardian ad litem has the authority to require an evaluation as part of the investigation of the allegations of the petitioner’s complaint.

Another option in both scenarios is to contact Adult Protective Services, and present the concerns about safety and financial exploitation. Adult Protective Services will do an inquiry provided that they are permitted in the home when they knock at the front door. Their investigation may take time and you may want immediate action.

As the attorney of a client with diminished capacity you also have a special duty to protect your client. Rule 1.14 (b) provides that an attorney should “take reasonably necessary protective action” when a client “is at risk of substantial physical, financial or other harm.” The American Bar Association suggests that the attorney may take action on behalf of a client under the following circumstances:

•?It is an emergency situation that threats the health, safety or financial interest of the person under disability;
•?Action is required only to the extent necessary to maintain the statusquo or otherwise avoid immediate or irreparable harm; and
•?Only confidential information necessary to achieve the intended action shall be disclosed by the attorney.

Although it seems that the attorney can make decisions in a proceeding on behalf of an impaired client, under no circumstance can an attorney perform any act, or make any decision, which the law requires the client to perform or make, if the client is legally incompetent.

From a legal stand point, incapacity is officially determined by the court. Otherwise there is a presumption of capacity. However, the practitioner will always have to assess whether the client has the capacity to enter into a contract of representation, and whether the client has the capacity to execute a legal document.

Even if the capacity is presumed, the practitioner must determine whether or not a prospective client has sufficient legal capacity to enter into a contract for the lawyer’s services. Then, the lawyer will have to evaluate the client’s legal capacity to carry out the specific legal transactions desired as part of the representation.

The failure to assess a client’s capacity has been asserted as grounds for legal malpractice by would-be beneficiaries of a client. The standards of practice continue to evolve as the prevalence of incapacity rises and as a greater awareness of the need to address capacity issues has emerged. Legal malpractice for failure to address capacity questions in cases is no longer a remote possibility, and with Rule 1.14 (b) attorneys are also required to take steps to protect their clients.

- By Yahne Piorini, who practices elder law with Miorini Law PLLC in McLean.

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Monday, May 14, 2012

Richmond judge hearing Social Security Disability claims has one of the highest denail rates in the country

 

Richmond ALJ hearing Social Security claims has one of the highest denial rates in the country

By Virginia Lawyers Weekly
Published: May 14, 2012
Tags: , Disability Claim
 
As an occupational therapist, Michelle Bomar worked with people suffering from injuries or diseases. But in 1998, she said, she found herself in as much distress as any patient: A slew of illnesses had started attacking her immune system, causing intense pain and fatigue.

Bomar said she couldn’t work. So she quit her job as a therapist and filed a claim for disability benefits with the Social Security Administration.

Fourteen years later, she is still waiting for help and wallowing in debt. Her disability benefits request has been denied several times.

That’s no surprise. Her case is before Administrative Law Judge Drew A. Swank of Richmond, and he has one of the highest denial rates in the country. Swank rejects nearly eight of every 10 claims for disability benefits, according to a computer analysis of his rulings.

Attorneys and claimants who’ve had cases before Swank say he is unfair. For example, they say he refuses to let vocational experts present evidence in support of requests for disability benefits.

“All I’ve ever wanted is for him to do this right,” said Bruce Billman, a Richmond-area attorney who represents people seeking assistance under the Social Security Disability Insurance program.

“If he wants to turn people down, at least do it on the proper evidence, using the proper witnesses, and give us a chance.”

Billman is a former president of the National Organization of Social Security Claimants’ Representatives. He has filed several complaints with the Social Security Administration, accusing Swank of failing to provide due process.

Highest denial rate


Between October 2009 and March 2012, administrative law judges hired by the Social Security Administration decided more than 1.5 million disability cases, according to a computer analysis of the agency’s data. The Social Security Administration has about 1,300 administrative law judges at any one time.

Nationally, the judges denied 37 percent of the cases and made rulings “fully favorable” to the claimants 58 percent of the time. The remaining decisions were “partially favorable.”

Virginia judges denied 40 percent of the cases they considered and issued “fully favorable” rulings 53 percent of the time.

Swank, who has been an ALJ since 2006, had the highest denial rate in Virginia and one of the highest in the country. He decided 1,136 cases and rejected 79 percent. Swank made “fully favorable” decisions 6 percent of the time, by far the lowest in the country for judges who’ve decided more than 1,000 cases.

In Virginia, 50 judges have handled Social Security Disability Insurance claims since October 2009. Only one judge had a denial rate to rival Swank’s: Mark O’Hara of Charlottesville rejected 77 percent of the cases he heard.

Swank had the lowest rate of “fully favorable” rulings of any judge in Virginia; the runner-up was O’Hara, who completely sided with claimants 17 percent of the time.

At the other end of the spectrum, three Virginia judges made “fully favorable” decisions almost 80 percent of the time: Robert Habermann of Roanoke, and John McNamee-Alemany and John Murdock of Falls Church.

Many ALJs have handled only a handful of cases. Nationwide, there were 856 judges who made at least 1,000 rulings since October 2009. Among those judges, Swank had the third-highest denial rate. At the top of the list were two Dallas judges: Walter Orr, who rejected 86 percent of his cases, and Peri Collins of Dallas, who rejected 83 percent.

‘Unable to work’ but no benefits

It’s not just statistics that have raised concerns among parties who’ve gone before Swank.

Attorneys and claimants accuse Swank of disregarding or excluding the findings of their physicians and vocational experts.

Bomar’s physician deemed her unable to work in a letter submitted as evidence at her disability hearing.

“Ms. Bomar has been physically unable to work on a full-time or part-time basis and that inability has existed since well before December 2003,” stated Dr. Rosalia M. Lomeo of Fredericksburg, Bomar’s physician since 2002.

Lomeo said Bomar suffers from lupus, fibromyalgia, seronegative rheumatoid arthritis and chronic fatigue syndrome.

Swank denied Bomar’s request for disability benefits, saying Lomeo’s evaluation was not credible.
Bomar, who lives in the Ladysmith community in Caroline County, questioned how Swank could have reached the conclusion that she was able to work when her doctor had stated otherwise.

“He thinks he’s so righteous and omnipotent, that nobody could possibly know more than he does,” Bomar said. “The man thinks he’s God.”

Billman, who has practiced disability law for more than 30 years, has filed more than 400 pages of complaints against Swank with the Social Security Administration’s chief administrative law judge in Falls Church. The documents describe what Billman sees as numerous instances of unfairness toward his clients.
However, no action has been taken against Swank.

“He is untouchable,” Billman said. “And every time you file a complaint and nothing gets done, it just reinforces that with him. There’s no system in place to protect you from somebody like this.”

Billman said he complained about Swank in 2008. Until that point, the judge had denied about half of his cases, Billman said. Since the complaint, he said, Swank has denied about 90 percent of his cases.

Refusing testimony of experts

Other lawyers also have complained.

Lawyers say they are at a disadvantage before Swank because he generally refuses to allow vocational experts to testify on behalf of people who claim a disability.

Billman said most jurisdictions require the use of a vocational expert if the claimant suffers from “non-exertional impairments,” such as anxiety attacks or other mental disorders, hearing or speech impairments, or a lack of fine muscle skills.

The Social Security Administration reported that vocational experts were used in about 72 percent of hearings in 2008. According to Billman, for hearings in which he appeared before Swank in 2008, the judge allowed a vocational expert only 12 percent of the time – and in every one of those cases, Swank was ordered to do so by his superiors.

Billman said he had 96 hearings before judges other than Swank, and they allowed the use of vocational experts 94 times.

Amy Vercillo, of the International Association of Rehabilitation Providers, said it’s rare for administrative law judges to deny the use of vocational experts.

“In ALJ training, they’re told that on adult disability hearings that there should be a vocational expert,” said Vercillo, who chairs her association’s Social Security vocational experts division.

Such experts can evaluate how claimants’ disabilities limit their work capabilities. “The vocational expertise brings the expertise of what jobs are in the market, what are the physical, educational, mental requirements for those jobs,” Vercillo said.

She added that a small number of administrative law judges refuse to use vocational experts.

“There’s no requirement that there’s a vocational expert,” Vercillo said. “The only time an ALJ is required to have a vocational expert is on remand hearings, when they’re ordered to do so.”

Swank says he’s muzzled

Over several weeks while researching this article, the reporters asked to interview Swank and emailed him questions. Swank said that he wants to defend his record but that he has not received permission from the Social Security Administration to talk to the media.

“The policy originates with the chief judge’s office in Fairfax, VA,” Swank wrote in an email.

He stated that there’s a “much bigger story here than you might realize.” But he said he could not elaborate because he doesn’t have permission to be interviewed.

Swank, who graduated from the Marshall-Wythe School of Law at the College of William and Mary, referred to an article that he had written for the Spring 2011 issue of the Rutgers Journal of Law & Public Policy. In that article, the judge pointed to people gaming the welfare system.

Some work in what Swank called a “shadow economy,” failing to pay taxes on earnings. Other people work fewer hours than they are capable of, to ensure they don’t make too much money to qualify for government benefits, the article said.

“The [Social Security] Administration has often placed a greater priority on quickly processing and paying disability claims with insufficient attention being given to verifying recipient reported information and controlling program expenditures,” Swank wrote. He added that abuse of the welfare system hurts taxpayers and those who genuinely deserve help.

Payments under the Social Security Disability Insurance are based on a complex formula and numerous factors, including a person’s projected lifetime earnings before the disability. On average, disabled workers receive $1,110 a month.

‘Free rein over people’s lives’

Susan Moreno believes she genuinely deserves help. She suffers from fibromyalgia, chronic fatigue syndrome, arthritis, scoliosis and degenerative disc disease. Moreno first went before Swank to seek disability benefits in 2008.

At the hearing, Swank ordered Moreno to see two Social Security Administration medical experts – a doctor and a psychologist. After those examinations, he said, he would make his ruling.

In the meantime, Billman filed his complaint against Swank. According to the Social Security Administration’s policy, judges are notified when complaints are filed – and they’re told who has complained.

At the second hearing, Swank dismissed the 700-page findings of Moreno’s treating physician as “unremarkable.” And he cast aside the findings of the Social Security Administration’s own doctors, who corroborated the judgment of Moreno’s physician.

Swank wouldn’t allow Billman to cross-examine either of the administration’s doctors. “All it comes down to is, we’re feeling the wrath of Drew Swank, plain and simple,” said Fred Moreno, Susan’s husband.
Swank went on to deny Susan Moreno’s case, and she appealed.

The appeals hearing was held the following year, in September 2010, and the situation deteriorated.
“At the very first hearing, it was like ‘Well, it could go either way,’ ” Susan Moreno said. “But at the appeal, he twisted everything to make himself look good. He treated me like I was an idiot. He consistently patronized me.”

She said Swank repeatedly used minute details to call her a hypocrite. For example, she said she could sit for only a limited amount of time, but Swank took this as exaggeration when she sat through the appeals process.

“I’m sitting there in pain, trying to get through this and be strong and be good for Bruce [Billman], but it just made things so much worse,” Moreno said.

“You hear about stuff like this, but you just don’t believe it.
Something is very wrong. They have free rein over people’s lives. Your life is in this man’s hands.”

Three months later, Swank again denied Moreno’s claim.

Financial and legal uncertainties

Sitting inside a roadside Denny’s, Michelle Bomar finished up the last of her pumpkin pancakes. She shifted uncomfortably on the pillow she brought in with her. As she thought back over the past 13 years, she conceded that she doesn’t know what comes next.

“I don’t know if I’ll have to move in with my husband’s parents or not,” Bomar said. “Our house is falling apart, my husband is completely overworked. Someone told me if it wasn’t for bad luck, I wouldn’t have any at all.”

While she sees some light on the horizon, she doesn’t know if it’s enough. Since her appeal was already remanded to Swank once, it cannot go back to him if it is remanded a second time. But the appeals process often takes two years or more.

Unable to work – and unable to collect Social Security disability benefits – Bomar says her ordeal has been devastating to her family, and especially to Christian, her 16-year-old son.

“Christian doesn’t remember all the things I used to do with him. We’d go to the museum, the park, the movies. He was so young,” Bomar said.

As for Billman, he said he doesn’t want to have Swank fired or his life ruined. He just wants the judge to give Moreno, Bomar and his other clients a fair shot at getting disability benefits from the Social Security Administration.

- By Sean Collins-Smith and Brandon Shulleeta

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Tuesday, May 01, 2012

Charlottesville Lawyer -- Jail workers sue over strip searches

Female workers sue over Portsmouth strip searches

PORTSMOUTH

Nan Vollette, a mental health counselor, knew working at the Portsmouth City Jail meant she was subject to searches. She figured she'd be subject to a pat-down, maybe.

Not in a million years, Vollette said, did she expect to have someone tell her to strip down for a visual body-cavity search.

"I don't think anybody would have expected that," she said.

Now she and eight other women - all employees of companies that hold contracts at the jail - have filed federal lawsuits against Portsmouth Sheriff Bill Watson.

The American Civil Liberties Union of Virginia, which represents the women, said in a news release Monday that the searches were conducted as "part of an ongoing investigation of drugs being brought into the jail."

Vollette's suit, which also names other jail staff members as defendants, states that around April 22, 2011, -Watson "ordered that all civilian contract employees be subjected to a strip search and visual body-cavity search."

It states that "Watson did not have any individualized suspicion that any particular employee.... was carrying on or about their person any contraband or illegal item into or out of the jail or committing any crime."

ACLU lawyers said the jail's actions violated the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution regarding unreasonable searches.

Watson said Monday that anyone coming into the jail, including himself, is "subject to be searched like anybody else."

"If anybody doesn't like the policy, look for a new job," he said. "We're going to stop this contraband from coming into this jail."

According to Vollette's suit, she was told she would be barred from the jail if she did not submit.

Vollette was told when she arrived at work that all the nurses at the jail had already submitted to the search, she said. Vollette and the nurses worked for the same company: Correct Care Solutions.

She felt faint, she said, and told a jail staff member: "This is very invasive. I don't know if I can do this."

The jail employee told her she had been directed to escort Vollette out the door if she refused.

Afterward, Vollette went up to her office.

"And I just cried like a baby. I'm almost 60 years old, and I cried like a baby.

"I think we all feel that we were raped," she said.

Vollette said people asked her afterward why she didn't just leave.

"It is a very intimidating situation," she said.

She had started working at the jail just two months earlier, she said, and didn't want to be left unemployed again.

Along with Vollette, six nurses with Correct Care Solutions filed suit. They are Angelene Cannon-Coleman, Barbara Stokley, Yolanda Vines, HaShena Hockaday, Verita Braswell and Emma Lee Floyd-Sharp. Suits also were filed on behalf of Marilyn Scott and Donnetta Austin, employees of Aramark Correctional Facility Food Service.

Vollette said six of the women still worked at the jail but had their security clearances revoked Monday.

The lawsuit was filed Friday.

According to Vollette's lawsuit, one of the sheriff's officials who performed searches told her "now you know how the inmates feel when we do this to them."

The suits seek monetary damages ranging from $5 million to $20 million, according to David Morgan, a Richmond attorney working on the case.

The lawsuits also seek an injunction to prevent such searches from occurring again.

The search policy is posted on the wall at every entrance to the jail. Watson said that the search was done on some deputies, as well, and that searches on women were done by women.

He said deputies did not find contraband on anyone, possibly because word was out that they were strip-searching people.

"Once we did that one strip-search, seemed like the contraband just dried right up."

Watson said all jails do similar searches, but Portsmouth had not done any in a while.

"You come in my jail, you're going to play by my rules. It's pretty laid out," he said.

Rebecca Glenberg, legal director with the ACLU of Virginia, said the organization has not heard of similar cases.

"Often, people who have been subjected to this very demeaning kind of search would rather just forget about it than to report it," she said.

According to two of the lawsuits, including Vollette's, the women were told to take off their clothes, bend over and cough so a staff member could "peer into" their body cavities. Glenberg explained that the term "visual body-cavity search" means no one "put their fingers in anyone's cavities."

Paula Miller, a spokeswoman for the Norfolk sheriff's office, said such a search would never be performed on employees there.

The Norfolk jail has signs telling people who enter that they are subject to search at any time, but that means an external search, Miller said. Deputies might check their pockets, briefcases and bags, wand them or have them walk through a metal detector, she said.

Miller said the director of professional standards there put it best, saying you don't strip-search contract workers just because you suspect someone is bringing contraband into the jail.

"It doesn't work like that," Miller said. "There has to be probable cause, and it's not just aimed at a group of people."

Janie Bryant, 757-446-2453, janie.bryant@pilotonline.com

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Monday, April 23, 2012

Charlottesville Estate Planning: Stepchild loses out under 'mirror-image' wills

“Mirror-image” language in reciprocal wills is not enough to keep a surviving spouse from diverting a stepchild’s inheritance, under a new decision released today by the Supreme Court of Virginia.

When Arvid and Lucy Keith married in 1972, each had a child from a prior marriage. In 1987, the Keiths made wills that were “mirror images,” with each leaving the estate to the surviving spouse, then in equal parts to Arvid’s son Walter Keith and Lucy’s daughter Venocia Lulofs.

Arvid died in 1996 and his estate passed to Lucy. She made a new will leaving everything to her daughter. When Lucy died in 2006, Keith challenged Lulofs’ attempted probate of the will.

But his uncorroborated testimony about what the parents intended was not enough to get a share of the estate. The attorney who drafted the 1987 wills had no recollection of what the couple intended. The married couple’s designation of a 50-50 split to their offspring of their life insurance proceeds did not mean they had a binding contract to keep that same split for their property when they died.

In a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court of Virginia agreed there was no irrevocable contract. Going along with Keith’s view of the evidence would mean a mirror-image will could “hamstring” a surviving spouse’s ability to provide for any future spouse or child born or adopted during a subsequent marriage, the high court said in Keith v. Lulofs.

Friday, April 20, 2012

Charlottesville - Lawyer goes solo in battle against dam project

Court defers decision on water plan lawsuit to May

DailyProgressBy Brian Wheeler
Charlottesville Tomorrow
Thursday, April 19, 2012

A retired immigration attorney from Madison who opposes the community water supply plan made his first appearance in Albemarle County Circuit Court on Thursday.

Stanton Braverman, who owns property in the city of Charlottesville, is challenging the Rivanna Water & Sewer Authority’s plans to implement the water plan approved in January. He told the court he is acting on his own and not taking any compensation.
20071126-AlbCo-Court
Albemarle County Courthouse (file photo)
After hearing from Braverman, lawyers representing the RWSA, and testimony by RWSA Executive Director Thomas L. Frederick Jr., Judge Cheryl V. Higgins deferred a decision and consolidated two separate cases before the courts.

The next hearing has been scheduled for May 18.

“I am way out of my league,” said Braverman in an interview before entering the court. “But I have learned so much in the last four weeks. People are coming to me from all over saying, ‘Hey, Stan, have you thought about suing this, have you thought about suing that.’”

Braverman, 70, joked that he took on the case because he “got tired of mowing the lawn.”

“When I walk in that door, and meet that judge, to me it’s a learning experience,” Braverman explained. “But really, I just got pissed. And anybody who knows me knows that when Stan Braverman gets pissed, he starts swinging.”

Inside the courtroom, Braverman sat by himself across from a phalanx of lawyers from the McGuire Woods law firm, Albemarle County, the city of Charlottesville and the Albemarle County Service Authority.

“Our major problem with what they are doing is that the city has failed to follow their due process responsibilities in the agreements for the dam,” Braverman told the court. “We feel the $765,000 [being paid by the city to the ACSA] represents the sale of land.”

Section 28 of the Charlottesville city code requires a referendum on the sale of public utilities. Section 9 of the Virginia Constitution requires a supermajority for the sale of public utilities.

Braverman said the “sale” could only have been legal if a supermajority of Charlottesville’s City Council had voted in favor of it as part of the cost-sharing agreement. The council voted 3-2 in favor of the water plan and a supermajority would have required four votes.

The January cost-sharing agreement identifies $765,000 as “the value of the city property required for construction of the new Ragged Mountain Dam and which will be inundated by the expansion of the Ragged Mountain Reservoir.”

Robert Hodges, an attorney from the Richmond office of McGuire Woods, countered on behalf of the RWSA that the transaction was a lease of land among public entities.

“The new leases are limited by their terms to 40 years,” Hodges told the court. “With respect to the [Virginia] Constitution, the limitation on the rights and transfer of municipal property doesn’t apply when the transfer is to another municipality.”

Higgins said the matter before the court Thursday was a bond validation hearing filed by the RWSA. She repeatedly sustained the plaintiff’s objections to matters raised by Braverman ranging from the RWSA’s “defective management” to whether the water plan was “a good idea.”

After Braverman filed his suit in the Charlottesville Circuit Court, the RWSA responded with a request to get an expedited hearing to resolve the case in an effort to allow it to move forward with the water plan’s bond financing.

Braverman made a motion to consolidate the cases so two courts wouldn’t be looking at the same case. There was no opposition from the RWSA’s attorneys to consolidation, which Higgins approved.

After the proceeding, Frederick declined to comment on the case.

“Out of respect for the court, we think it’s inappropriate for us to talk at this point in time about the case itself when it has not been heard to completion,” Frederick said. “That’s the job of the court and not for me to discuss with the news media.”

Frederick was asked if the deferral of the case to May 18 would delay the RWSA giving Thalle Construction the “notice to proceed” to begin clearing land for the new earthen dam at the Ragged Mountain Reservoir.

“We have heard nothing from the court in the way of any orders that would change the schedule and the work program that has been approved by our board,” Frederick said. “We will continue at this point in time to proceed.”

Frederick said final contract documents just received from Thalle Construction were currently under review.

“If the documents are correct and appropriate, we will then issue the notice to proceed,” Frederick said. “If that occurs before the 18th of May, then I believe we have the authority to do that.”

Braverman said he sees not only legal issues to resolve, but also an effort by local officials to “promote growth in the county over growth in the city.”

“The city doesn’t have any backup resources for water. If we lose this, we lose it,” Braverman said. “What I see going on in this area is that the county doesn’t really want us, they want to put a wall around [Charlottesville]. They want to turn this into Detroit where all the rich live in the suburbs and the poor in the city.” 
 

Tuesday, January 24, 2012

Bills seek notice to parents when a student is facing discipline

Parental notification about student disciplinary investigations sought

Schools would be required to notify parents if their child is the subject of a disciplinary investigation, under four bills up for consideration in the state Senate and House of Delegates.

The legislation, sponsored by Northern Virginia lawmakers, was inspired, in part, by incidents in Fairfax County in the past few years in which two students took their own lives following school disciplinary proceedings.

Steven Stuban, the father of one of the students, former Woodson High School football star Nick Stuban, will be in Richmond today to support the proposed legislation.

Currently, there is no statutory requirement for parental notification, though school districts may do so at their discretion. Proposed legislation would make it a requirement.

Senate Bill 164, sponsored by Sen. J. Chapman Petersen, D-Fairfax, would require parental notification before an administrative disciplinary investigation is undertaken that could result in the student's expulsion, or the notification of law enforcement.

Sen. David W. Marsden, D-Fairfax, proposes an even broader notification parameter in Senate Bill 391, requiring that parents be notified of an administrative investigation into any potential violation of school board policy.

Del. L. Kaye Kory, D-Fairfax, is sponsoring companion legislation in the House under House Bill 656.

House Bill 1080, sponsored by Del. Timothy D. Hugo, R-Fairfax, would require parental notification before a school administrator questions a student over a serious violation of school policy — specifically if such a violation could result in a student expulsion or referral to police.


The Senate bills are scheduled to be heard in the Education and Health committee on Thursday. The House bills will be considered in the Committee on Education subcommittee that also meets Thursday.

jnolan@timesdispatch.com (804) 649-6061

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Thursday, January 19, 2012

Divorce - Ex-wife, not widow, gets life insurance

Ex-Wife, Not Widow, Gets Life Insurance

By Deborah Elkins
Published: January 18, 2012

Tags: Divorce Attorney, , ,
 
An employee’s ex-wife collects his life insurance benefits after his death as the named beneficiary of a Federal Employees’ Group Life Insurance policy because federal law preempts Va. Code § 20-111.1(D), which otherwise would make the ex-wife liable to her ex-husband’s widow for those benefits; the Virginia Supreme Court reverses the decision for the widow.

In December 1996, Warren Hillman named his wife Judy Maretta the beneficiary of his FEGLI policy. They divorced in 1998 and Warren married his wife Jacqueline (Hillman); they were still married when Warren died in 2008. Maretta received the $124,558 death benefits. Hillman sued Maretta, arguing that under Va. Code § 20-111.1(D), Maretta was liable to Hillman for the death benefits. The trial court ruled for Hillman.
In the event of divorce, Code § 20-111.1(A) revokes any revocable beneficiary designation contained in a then-existing written contract owned by one party that provides on the payment of any death benefit to the other party. But subsection (D) says if subsection (A) is preempted by federal law with respect to payment of a death benefit, a former spouse who, not for value, receives the death benefit is personally liable to the person who have been entitled without preemption.

In contrast, the Federal Employees’ Group Life Insurance Act, 5 U.S.C. § 8701 et seq., contains an order of precedence that directs to whom benefits under a FEGLI policy are paid. FEGLIA also contains a preemption provision. In addition to the order of precedence in 5 U.S.C. § 8705(a) and the preemption provision in 5 U.S.C. § 8709(d)(1), FEGLIA and the regulations promulgated thereunder contain provisions relevant to the specific preemption question before us.

Code § 10-111.1(D) conflicts with federal law by standing as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. Therefore, we hold that Code § 20-111.1(D) is preempted by FEGLIA.

We are aware that our decision today stands in contrast to a majority of state court decisions.
Because Congress intended for FEGLI benefits to be paid and to belong to a designated beneficiary, we conclude that FEGLIA preempts Code § 20-111.1(D).

Reversed, and final judgment for Maretta.

Dissent

McClanahan, J., joined by Millette, J.: In my opinion, the high threshold for imposing preemption in the instant case has not been met. I do not believe Code § 20-111.1(D) (triggered itself upon federal preemption of subsection A of the statute) is preempted by the Federal Employees’ Group Life Insurance Act.

I agree with the majority of state courts in other jurisdictions that have addressed the issue of preemption under FEGLIA and have similarly concluded their state domestic relations laws, in creating an equitable claim for an amount equal to the FEGLI insurance proceeds that have been paid to the named beneficiary, are not preempted by FEGLIA. I would affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

Maretta v. Hillman (Kinser) No. 102042, Jan. 13, 2012; Fairfax Cir.Ct. (Devine) George O. Peterson, Tania M.L. Saylor for appellant; Daniel H. Ruttenberg for appellee. VLW 012-6-009, 32 pp.

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Wednesday, January 18, 2012

Personal Injury - Owner can be sued for missing steps

Owner Can Be Sued For Missing Steps


A Norfolk Circuit Court says a prospective buyer who entered a Fannie-Mae-owned home and was seriously injured when he walked down unlit basement stairs that were missing multiple steps at the bottom, can sue Fannie Mae, but not the realty company or brokers, for common law negligence and negligence per se.

A defense of contributory negligence is rarely raised by demurrer because the complaint rarely shows it. No defendant specifically raised contributory negligence in the demurrer. FNMA raised it in its supporting memorandum, citing Baker v. Butterworth, 119 Va. 402 (1916), and Smith v. Wiley-Hall Motors Inc., 184 Va. 49 (1945).

Would the present Supreme Court rule as it did in Baker? I think not. The substantive law of contributory negligence has not changed since Baker and Smith, but the appellate reception of pretrial dismissals of negligence actions is now quite frosty. The Supreme Court has often criticized actions by circuit courts that “short-circuit” litigation. Motions to strike are disfavored in negligence actions. As tempting as it might be to find contributory negligence as a matter of law on the face of this amended complaint, if I were to do so I would probably be remiss if I did not also instruct the clerk to stamp, “REVERSE ME!” in large orange letters on the cover of the file he sends to Richmond. Thus, I believe I must consider the other arguments defendants have made.

What are the agents here alleged to have done? “On information and belief” they marketed the house as having a basement. They “or a person or persons on their behalf” took photographs of several rooms and placed a sign in the house and a lockbox behind it; they listed the property for sale and someone entered the same day; someone from JSB Realty  gave plaintiff the combination to the lockbox. There is no allegation they knew of the danger; sufficient facts have not been pleaded to show they ought to have known it. There is no allegation that any agent or employee of JSB had inspected the property, or had shown it to a prospective purchaser before plaintiff entered, or was on the property when plaintiff fell. There is no allegation anyone warned JSB or the two defendant brokers of this dangerous condition. There is an allegation FNMA had an inspection made in late August 2009, but there is no claim JSB or the two brokers ever saw it or that any problem with the stairs was noted. Rule 3:18 (b) allows negligence to be pleaded “without specifying the particulars,” but there must be sufficient facts alleged to demonstrate a duty and a breach.

Plaintiff alleges a real estate agent engaged to sell property has the duties to keep the premises reasonably safe and to inspect, repair and maintain the premises. He cites no authority in support of his claim, and Turner v. Carneal, 156 Va. 889 (1931), is against him on this. I sustain the demurrer of JSB and the two brokers to the claim for common law negligence.

I overrule FNMA’s demurrer to the common law negligence claim. As the owner of the property, FNMA had a duty to use ordinary care to have the premises in a reasonably safe condition for an invitee’s visit. An invitee entering a building with an interest in purchasing it might reasonably be expected to look at the basement. A dark stairway with several missing steps is not reasonably safe.

The court also sustains the demurrers of JSB and the brokers to plaintiff’s claim for negligence per se; a real estate agent engaged to sell property does not have a legal or equitable interest in it or control it for purposes of the Virginia Maintenance Code. I overrule FNMA’s demurrer to this claim.

The court sustains FNMA’s demurrer to a claim for nuisance; to allow a nuisance claim to proceed on these facts would confuse the causes of action.

Moran v. Fed. Nat’l Mtge. Ass’n (Martin) No. CL 10-6841, Nov. 21, 2011; Norfolk Cir. Ct.; Joseph J. Perez, Alexander K. Page, Herbert V. Kelly Jr., Stephen A. Horvath, R. Craig Gallagher for the parties. VLW 011-8-222, 5 pp.

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