Tuesday, January 31, 2012

Public urination bill gets zipped by committee

Public urination bill doused by Va. Senate committee


An attempt to make public urination a crime was effectively flushed for the year this morning.

State Sen. J. Chapman "Chap" Petersen offered a bill, SB 626, at the request of a northern Virginia homeowners group whose residents, he said, have complained about students from a nearby college using their shrubs as makeshift urinals after evenings out drinking.

Petersen noted that under existing law, public urination charges are often filed as indecent exposure violations, a class 1 misdemeanor. His proposal would have made it a class 4 misdemeanor, which carries a lesser penalty - a fine of up to $250.

"I put this in, I think it's self-explanatory," Petersen, D-Fairfax County, told the Senate Courts of Justice Committee, adding that it wouldn't be a retroactive law.

His proposal elicited snickers and mumbled jokes from senators he presented it to, though nothing approaching toilet humor.

"Rushing water makes you do strange things," said committee chairman Sen. Tommy Norment, R-James City County.

Members bypassed Petersen's proposal on a voice vote.

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Monday, January 30, 2012

A run on general district court

A run on general district court
Change in limit didn’t prompt wave of filings, but protective order law did

By Peter Vieth
Published: January 30, 2012

Tags: Law Firm,
 


General district court judges and clerks anticipated a run on their courts after the 2011 General Assembly passed several measures opening up access to their courts.

One new law, raising the jurisdictional limit to $25,000, left court personnel expecting a flurry of new filings, with personal injury attorneys taking the fast track through district court on smaller-value cases.

That hasn’t brought a wave of new litigants to general district court, but a different new law produced a surprise and an inundation of people seeking to use the court to get a protective order.

Legislation approved by the 2011 Assembly now allows courts to issue protective orders in cases of dating violence, sexual assault and stalking, even when the victim is not a member of the accused’s household. The cases involving non-household members go to general district court. Previously, most protective order cases were heard by juvenile and domestic relations courts.

“That thing opened a floodgate of litigation,” said Judge Robert A. Pustilnik of Richmond General District Court, referring to the new protective order legislation. Court officials from various localities said there was an initial rush of petitioners seeking protective orders when the new law took effect July 1.

Virginia Beach lawyer Kirk Levy said the wave of litigants seeking restraining orders were holding up hearings on the collections cases he had filed. A petition for a protective order has top priority on the court’s dockets, so other cases had to wait.

“Slowly but surely, it’s beginning to dwindle,” said Andre Henry Mayfield, general district court clerk in Virginia Beach. “People are getting settled in with it now.”

Mayfield made it clear, however, that the numbers were not dropping to pre-July levels. He said where his court might see four to five people a month applying for protective orders in years past, there are 10 to 15 petitioners a month now.

Court officials say many of the petitions for protective orders are frivolous. Some petitioners have ulterior motives, such as a landlord seeking a fast eviction, Mayfield said.

David M. Hicks, clerk of the Richmond Manchester General District Court, said he had to process a petition filed by a woman angered because a neighbor blew leaves into her yard. “People are using these protective orders in absolutely absurd ways,” Hicks said.

Both clerks say they have to prepare the paperwork for such petitions, notifying the police department and the sheriff. A deputy has to serve the paperwork on the defendant.

“There’s a lot of behind-the-scenes work before it gets to the court,” Hicks said.

Hicks said he does not question the importance of access to protective orders in proper cases. “Protective orders are very, very important if they’re used in the right way. These are not,” he said.

Pustilnik feared even more unfounded petitions if legislation passes to allow protective orders for the custody of animals. House Bill 363, sponsored by Del. Jennifer L. McClellan, D-Richmond, is before the House Courts committee.

Under the law that took effect in July, protective orders can target “acts of violence, force or threat” causing injury or “reasonable apprehension” of injury or death. While a few petitions may be testing the limits of that definition, an advocate for victims of violence says the new law is doing what was intended.

Gena Boyle, of the Virginia Sexual and Domestic Violence Action Alliance in Charlottesville, said victims who previously had to file criminal warrants and try to persuade a magistrate to issue an arrest warrant now are able to quickly seek protection from a judge.

Boyle said the revised law – crafted after two years of study – has been particularly effective in helping college students confronted with violence or stalking. “We just wanted to find a way that would cover these victims,” she said.

Boyle said no figures were available yet on the number of petitions filed and issued since July.

Pressure for change grew after the 2010 death of University of Virginia student Yeardley Love. Love’s ex-boyfriend, George Huguely, is charged with murder in the case. He reportedly admitted to police he broke down a locked door, shook Love and repeatedly struck her head against a wall.

Police allegedly have evidence of earlier incidents or threats of violence by Huguely directed at Love.

P.I. docket popular in GDCs.

Virginia’s district courts seem to have taken in stride the increase in civil cases coming from the court’s expanded jurisdiction.

“Most people thought that personal injury cases were going to go through the roof,” but that “has not been the case,” said Virginia Beach clerk Mayfield.

“It’s been wonderful,” said Suzette L. Hutchens of Richmond. “You get to court quicker” in district court, she said. Presenting medical bills with authenticating affidavits is a lot easier and cheaper than taking doctors’ depositions. “You can try these cases in an hour,” she said.

“For the average case, it just makes more sense to bring it in the general district court,” Hutchens said.
Judges also have voiced approval, said Reston lawyer Steven M. Garver, who chaired a committee that studied the proposed jurisdictional change for the Boyd-Graves Conference.

While there has been some increase in case numbers, the judges reported that attorneys seemed to know what they were doing in trying district court cases. Judges in Fairfax asked for special notice for cases expected to take two hours or more, but Garver said most run-of-the-mill p.i. cases can be tried in less than two hours.

Garver said there was talk that some insurance companies – possibly concerned about being blindsided with damages evidence – would appeal every district court judgment to circuit court. That threat has not materialized, according to Garver and other lawyers VLW contacted.

“The bottom line is most adjusters are just happy to have a decision made, and they can close the file,” Garver said.

“I haven’t heard of a rash of appeals,” said Roanoke lawyer Peter A. Katt. Katt reported he maxed out a district court claim with a recent $25,000 judgment in Botetourt County in a rear-end collision case, and the award was not appealed.

Pustilnik, the Richmond judge, said he’s setting three to five civil cases for trial every day. “Really I think it’s a boon to both the plaintiffs’ and defense bars,” Pustilnik said.

One potential obstacle for defendants – the need to post a bond in the amount of judgment for appeals to circuit court – was addressed with a provision allowing confirmation of insurance coverage to be filed in place of bond.

Judges split on whether you could amend cases filed before July 1 to increase demands into the new jurisdictional territory. “Most judges ruled you could amend,” Garver said.

Virginia Beach lawyer Kevin Duffan said he found the higher jurisdictional cap was resulting in more cases settled rather than cases tried. He pointed out the new jurisdictional limit is the same as the minimum limits of Virginia auto insurance policies.

Duffan said the change has not led to clogging of the Virginia Beach district docket. “It’s actually worked out very well,” he said.

Tim Quick, immediate past president of the Virginia Beach Bar Association, said some judges opened up a 2 p.m. docket for the extra contested cases to keep attorneys from having to wait long hours for their cases to be heard.

Quick said he hasn’t seen any problems with the extra civil cases in any of his regular venues, including Norfolk, Chesapeake, Portsmouth and Virginia Beach.

While one argument for expanding district court jurisdiction to $25,000 was the perceived need to keep up with inflation, the increase is really a fundamental change from the original civil role of district courts.

Alexandria General District Chief Judge Becky J. Moore noted the court started in 1952 with authority to hear cases up to $1,000 in value. Adjusting for the increase in the consumer price index since then, the court’s jurisdiction would be capped at only $8,488 today, she said.

Prof. Hamilton Bryson at the University of Richmond law school takes the view that the nearly threefold increase in the civil authority of district courts is really an effort to “decrease the circuit court workload by offloading the cases of small value to the district court.”

Nevertheless, the change increases access to the courts, “so it’s probably a good thing,” Bryson said.
Moore, the Fairfax chief judge, said she fears the case count will rise. “The numbers themselves may not seem significant, but these cases are quite time-consuming,” she said.

Moore said of 25 civil cases on the Fairfax district docket one day last week, four involved claims for $25,000 in damages.

Regardless of the extra caseload, Pustilnik said he welcomes the new faces of attorneys he now sees trying civil cases in his court. “It’s made our docket much, much more interesting,” he said.

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Thursday, January 26, 2012

Family Law: Dad must pay half for college

Dad Must Pay Half for College

By Deborah Elkins
Published: January 26, 2012

Tags: Family Law Attorney, , ,
 
In mother’s show cause proceeding, the Court of Appeals affirms a trial court order requiring father to pay one-half of his son’s college attendance under a 1996 agreement incorporated in the final divorce decree; the trial court properly excluded evidence of mother’s alleged breaches and interpreted the agreement to obligate father on college costs without being consulted.

Parents divorced in 1996.  Their final divorce decree incorporated an agreement regarding their son’s education.  The agreement provided for sharing expenses equally and expressly required consultation with father through grade 12. After son began college, mother petitioned for a rule to show cause, alleging father’s breach of his obligations under the divorce decree.  Father responded that the agreement required consulting him before he could be liable for college costs.  He also argued mother had breached the agreement.  The trial court excluded father’s evidence of alleged breaches and interpreted the agreement not to require consulting father on college.

On appeal, father challenges the trial court’s exclusion of his evidence of other alleged breaches and its interpretation of the agreement.  We affirm.  Admissibility of evidence is a discretionary determination.  The contract defense of material breach does not apply in show cause proceedings to enforce an agreement incorporated into a decree under Va. Code § 20-109.1.  Opening the door to evidence of mutual allegations of noncompliance would have the effect of turning minor skirmishes into an Armageddon of recriminations.  Contract principles do apply to interpretation of agreements.  Ambiguity is a question of law we review de novo.  The agreement here unambiguously requires father to pay one-half of college costs and does not specifically require consulting him.  A paragraph included in the divorce decree by its terms is limited to the child’s minority and specifies a geographic scope inappropriate for college.  The trial court correctly interpreted the agreement not to require consulting father on college.  We remand for a determination of mother’s appellate attorney’s fees to which she is entitled under the express terms of the agreement.

Bousman v. Lhommedieu (McCullough) No. 0932-11-4, Jan. 24, 2012; Fairfax County Cir. Ct. (Devine) David L. Duff for appellant, Stephen G. Cochran for appellee.  VLW 012-7-018 (UP), 8 pp.

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Wednesday, January 25, 2012

Fighting for justice on behalf of injured Virginians

Fighting for justice on behalf of injured Virginians

Tag:  Charlottesville Personal Injury Attorney











Yvonne Griffin was part of the Charlottesville Legal Delegation lobbying the State Capital for the Virginia Trial Lawyers Associate on Justice Day.  Yvonne and her colleagues visited our local Delegates and State Senators promoting passage of bills to protect injured people's rights in the courtroom.

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Fugitive spotted on reality TV show faces judge

Fugitive spotted on reality show appears in court

Authorities say suspect in sex crime fled country to avoid trial 10 years ago

By Alex Bridges -- abridges@nvdaily.com
Tag:  Charlottesville Attorney
Dick_III_William.jpg
View larger image

William Edgar Dick III

    
WINCHESTER -- A man authorities say fled the country to avoid trial on a sex crime charge pleaded guilty Tuesday for failing to appear in court 10 years ago.

William Edgar Dick II appeared in Frederick County Circuit Court with his attorney, public defender Timothy Coyne.

Dick, 30, with a last known address of Polk City, Fla., pleaded guilty to the felony charge of failing to appear in the court Jan. 9, 2002. Retired Judge Benjamin Kendrick accepted the plea.

Kendrick set Dick's charge of forcible sodomy for a jury trial April 27. The judge delayed sentencing on the failure to appear charge until the same date. Commonwealth's Attorney Glenn Williamson did not object to continuing Dick's sentencing to the April date.

Dick remains held at the Northwestern Regional Adult Detention Center.

Authorities accuse Dick of committing forcible sodomy against a male victim on June 10, 2000. A grand jury indicted Dick on the charge a year later, court records show. A judge scheduled his jury trial for Jan. 9, 2002, but Dick failed to appear. Authorities searched unsuccessfully for the defendant, who was declared a fugitive by the court.

Investigators with the Frederick County Sheriff's Office continued to look for clues into Dick's whereabouts and had hints he may have fled the country, possibly to Costa Rica.

In 2010 an investigator received a tip from a friend of the alleged victim in the sodomy case that the fugitive had appeared as a bartender in an episode of the MTV reality show, "The Hills," which the network filmed in Costa Rica. Further investigation confirmed Dick appeared in the episode under a different name, according to documents filed in U.S. District Court in Harrisonburg.

A federal judge in U.S. District Court in Harrisonburg on Oct. 25, 2010, issued a complaint and a warrant for Dick's arrest for unlawful flight to avoid prosecution.

Costa Rican authorities handed Dick over to United States custody, although extradition policies and other hurdles had delayed the process for months. Dick returned to the U.S., and ultimately Frederick County, in August.

A Frederick County Circuit Court grand jury indicted Dick on the charge of failing to appear in September.

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Tuesday, January 24, 2012

Bills seek notice to parents when a student is facing discipline

Parental notification about student disciplinary investigations sought

Schools would be required to notify parents if their child is the subject of a disciplinary investigation, under four bills up for consideration in the state Senate and House of Delegates.

The legislation, sponsored by Northern Virginia lawmakers, was inspired, in part, by incidents in Fairfax County in the past few years in which two students took their own lives following school disciplinary proceedings.

Steven Stuban, the father of one of the students, former Woodson High School football star Nick Stuban, will be in Richmond today to support the proposed legislation.

Currently, there is no statutory requirement for parental notification, though school districts may do so at their discretion. Proposed legislation would make it a requirement.

Senate Bill 164, sponsored by Sen. J. Chapman Petersen, D-Fairfax, would require parental notification before an administrative disciplinary investigation is undertaken that could result in the student's expulsion, or the notification of law enforcement.

Sen. David W. Marsden, D-Fairfax, proposes an even broader notification parameter in Senate Bill 391, requiring that parents be notified of an administrative investigation into any potential violation of school board policy.

Del. L. Kaye Kory, D-Fairfax, is sponsoring companion legislation in the House under House Bill 656.

House Bill 1080, sponsored by Del. Timothy D. Hugo, R-Fairfax, would require parental notification before a school administrator questions a student over a serious violation of school policy — specifically if such a violation could result in a student expulsion or referral to police.


The Senate bills are scheduled to be heard in the Education and Health committee on Thursday. The House bills will be considered in the Committee on Education subcommittee that also meets Thursday.

jnolan@timesdispatch.com (804) 649-6061

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Friday, January 20, 2012

Personal Injury Attorney Yvonne Griffin Recognized as a "Distinguished Dozen"

Dozen: Griffin makes helping women her law

Dozen: Griffin 
 
“She’s never too busy to answer a question. I think everyone feels comfortable knocking on her door.”

When Yvonne Griffin is not fighting for her clients in the courtroom, she is fighting to empower other women in the legal profession.

“She’s done a lot for the field of law in Virginia. She’s done a lot for women,” said Mike Griffin, Griffin’s husband of 31 years.

Yvonne Griffin was made a partner at Tucker Griffin Barnes, P.C. in 1997. Mike Griffin works as the firm’s business manager.

“She’s really been a great mentor to the women coming through the firm. She always takes the young attorneys under her wing,” he said.

Of the seven partners at Tucker Griffin Barnes, only one, founding partner Bill Tucker, is male. Tucker said this fact is due largely to Griffin’s influence.

Together, he and Griffin founded the Women’s Legal Group at their firm, which provides legal counsel “from a woman’s point of view.”

“A woman lawyer sometimes has a different perspective,” Tucker said. “We [men] don’t have feelings, but a woman does. Maybe that’s not such a bad thing in the law.”

Sometimes, Griffin noted, clients are drawn to Tucker Griffin Barnes because they are seeking a female attorney.

“When you run your own business, you are constantly looking for ways to differentiate yourself,” Griffin said. “I’ve had men who’ve hired me who have said ‘women are meaner than men,’” she added.

Griffin is known to be an “aggressive advocate” for her clients, Lynn Bradley, another partner at Tucker Griffin Barnes, said, but outside of the courtroom she said Griffin is very even-tempered and approachable.

“She’s never too busy to answer a question. I think everyone feels comfortable knocking on her door,” Bradley said. “I think she’s a really good mentor for attorneys whether they are male or female.”

Griffin is active in legal organizations that serve men and women alike. She serves on the governing board for the Virginia Trial Lawyers. In the past she has been a member of the American Bar Association, the Thomas Jefferson Inn of Courts and the Association of Trial Lawyers of America.

Though Griffin is a successful full-time lawyer, it is hard to find a more dedicated wife and mother.

Even with a lengthy list of college degrees, personal achievements and community involvement, she lists her marriage and son, Sam, 20, as her proudest accomplishments.

Perhaps that is why Griffin is such a strong advocate for other women who are juggling their professional lives with their responsibilities at home.

Together with Tucker, Griffin started the Bring Your Babies to Work program at their firm nearly two decades ago.

After one of Tucker’s paralegals became pregnant, the firm was faced with the possibility of losing a strong member of their legal team.

“We decided we would rather have her at 80 percent capacity than at zero percent capacity,” Yvonne Griffin explained, and so the firm began to allow mothers to bring their infants to work with them every day, rather than spending money on costly child care in the first weeks of life.

This allows mothers to spend more time with their children, but also brings them back into the workforce sooner after giving birth, even if they may be a bit distracted.

“It’s important for babies and mamas to bond,” Griffin said. “It’s been a good thing all the way around.”

Though Griffin did not enact this company policy single-handedly, she was instrumental in making it “more than words on a page,” Bradley said. She added that Griffin went out of her way to make women feel comfortable with the unusual policy, and encouraged them to bring their children to work.

When Bradley was an associate with Tucker Griffin Barnes she became pregnant with her daughter. The firm allowed her to work part-time — as little as two days per week — so that she could spend more time with her child.

“As a lawyer, that’s practically unheard of,” she said. As her daughter got older, Bradley added more and more time to her workload before coming back full-time after her daughter started kindergarten.

“They didn’t penalize me in any way when I came back,” she said. In fact, the firm welcomed Bradley as a partner just one year later.

Griffin said she knew she wanted to be a lawyer as early as the fifth grade, and has been practicing law since graduating from the College of William & Mary’s law school in 1988. For the past 18 years, she has served exclusively as a personal injury lawyer. Her caseload deals with car wrecks, wrongful death and medical malpractice.

“I enjoy helping people who need help,” she said. “It’s one of the paramount reasons I’m a lawyer.”

Griffin’s caring and generous spirit is evident outside of the office, as well. She is involved with the Blue Ridge Chapter of the National Multiple Sclerosis Society, where she served as vice president from 2004 to 2005 and secretary in 2006.

“Being a part of the community where you practice is also very important. I like doing things that make the community a better place,” Griffin said.

Griffin’s husband noted her involvement with efforts such as the Toy Lift and Buford Middle School’s Rule of Law Day.

In 2000, Griffin and her law partners put on the area’s Fourth of July fireworks celebration.

“There just wasn’t another organization that would or could take the necessary steps to make this important and historic event happen,” Mike Griffin said, adding that Yvonne was involved in the production of the fireworks show for several more years.

Despite all of her accomplishments, Griffin is humble and grateful to her coworkers at Tucker Griffin Barnes for their expertise and dedication to the legal field.

“I’m proud of the firm [Tucker and I] built. In 20 or 21 years, we have built a really good law firm with a good reputation,” she said. “It’s gratifying to have started something that is doing so much good for people.”

Yvonne T. Griffin
Tucker Griffin Barnes P.C.
Charlottesville, VA
434-973-7474
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Thursday, January 19, 2012

Divorce - Ex-wife, not widow, gets life insurance

Ex-Wife, Not Widow, Gets Life Insurance

By Deborah Elkins
Published: January 18, 2012

Tags: Divorce Attorney, , ,
 
An employee’s ex-wife collects his life insurance benefits after his death as the named beneficiary of a Federal Employees’ Group Life Insurance policy because federal law preempts Va. Code § 20-111.1(D), which otherwise would make the ex-wife liable to her ex-husband’s widow for those benefits; the Virginia Supreme Court reverses the decision for the widow.

In December 1996, Warren Hillman named his wife Judy Maretta the beneficiary of his FEGLI policy. They divorced in 1998 and Warren married his wife Jacqueline (Hillman); they were still married when Warren died in 2008. Maretta received the $124,558 death benefits. Hillman sued Maretta, arguing that under Va. Code § 20-111.1(D), Maretta was liable to Hillman for the death benefits. The trial court ruled for Hillman.
In the event of divorce, Code § 20-111.1(A) revokes any revocable beneficiary designation contained in a then-existing written contract owned by one party that provides on the payment of any death benefit to the other party. But subsection (D) says if subsection (A) is preempted by federal law with respect to payment of a death benefit, a former spouse who, not for value, receives the death benefit is personally liable to the person who have been entitled without preemption.

In contrast, the Federal Employees’ Group Life Insurance Act, 5 U.S.C. § 8701 et seq., contains an order of precedence that directs to whom benefits under a FEGLI policy are paid. FEGLIA also contains a preemption provision. In addition to the order of precedence in 5 U.S.C. § 8705(a) and the preemption provision in 5 U.S.C. § 8709(d)(1), FEGLIA and the regulations promulgated thereunder contain provisions relevant to the specific preemption question before us.

Code § 10-111.1(D) conflicts with federal law by standing as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. Therefore, we hold that Code § 20-111.1(D) is preempted by FEGLIA.

We are aware that our decision today stands in contrast to a majority of state court decisions.
Because Congress intended for FEGLI benefits to be paid and to belong to a designated beneficiary, we conclude that FEGLIA preempts Code § 20-111.1(D).

Reversed, and final judgment for Maretta.

Dissent

McClanahan, J., joined by Millette, J.: In my opinion, the high threshold for imposing preemption in the instant case has not been met. I do not believe Code § 20-111.1(D) (triggered itself upon federal preemption of subsection A of the statute) is preempted by the Federal Employees’ Group Life Insurance Act.

I agree with the majority of state courts in other jurisdictions that have addressed the issue of preemption under FEGLIA and have similarly concluded their state domestic relations laws, in creating an equitable claim for an amount equal to the FEGLI insurance proceeds that have been paid to the named beneficiary, are not preempted by FEGLIA. I would affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

Maretta v. Hillman (Kinser) No. 102042, Jan. 13, 2012; Fairfax Cir.Ct. (Devine) George O. Peterson, Tania M.L. Saylor for appellant; Daniel H. Ruttenberg for appellee. VLW 012-6-009, 32 pp.

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Wednesday, January 18, 2012

Personal Injury - Owner can be sued for missing steps

Owner Can Be Sued For Missing Steps


A Norfolk Circuit Court says a prospective buyer who entered a Fannie-Mae-owned home and was seriously injured when he walked down unlit basement stairs that were missing multiple steps at the bottom, can sue Fannie Mae, but not the realty company or brokers, for common law negligence and negligence per se.

A defense of contributory negligence is rarely raised by demurrer because the complaint rarely shows it. No defendant specifically raised contributory negligence in the demurrer. FNMA raised it in its supporting memorandum, citing Baker v. Butterworth, 119 Va. 402 (1916), and Smith v. Wiley-Hall Motors Inc., 184 Va. 49 (1945).

Would the present Supreme Court rule as it did in Baker? I think not. The substantive law of contributory negligence has not changed since Baker and Smith, but the appellate reception of pretrial dismissals of negligence actions is now quite frosty. The Supreme Court has often criticized actions by circuit courts that “short-circuit” litigation. Motions to strike are disfavored in negligence actions. As tempting as it might be to find contributory negligence as a matter of law on the face of this amended complaint, if I were to do so I would probably be remiss if I did not also instruct the clerk to stamp, “REVERSE ME!” in large orange letters on the cover of the file he sends to Richmond. Thus, I believe I must consider the other arguments defendants have made.

What are the agents here alleged to have done? “On information and belief” they marketed the house as having a basement. They “or a person or persons on their behalf” took photographs of several rooms and placed a sign in the house and a lockbox behind it; they listed the property for sale and someone entered the same day; someone from JSB Realty  gave plaintiff the combination to the lockbox. There is no allegation they knew of the danger; sufficient facts have not been pleaded to show they ought to have known it. There is no allegation that any agent or employee of JSB had inspected the property, or had shown it to a prospective purchaser before plaintiff entered, or was on the property when plaintiff fell. There is no allegation anyone warned JSB or the two defendant brokers of this dangerous condition. There is an allegation FNMA had an inspection made in late August 2009, but there is no claim JSB or the two brokers ever saw it or that any problem with the stairs was noted. Rule 3:18 (b) allows negligence to be pleaded “without specifying the particulars,” but there must be sufficient facts alleged to demonstrate a duty and a breach.

Plaintiff alleges a real estate agent engaged to sell property has the duties to keep the premises reasonably safe and to inspect, repair and maintain the premises. He cites no authority in support of his claim, and Turner v. Carneal, 156 Va. 889 (1931), is against him on this. I sustain the demurrer of JSB and the two brokers to the claim for common law negligence.

I overrule FNMA’s demurrer to the common law negligence claim. As the owner of the property, FNMA had a duty to use ordinary care to have the premises in a reasonably safe condition for an invitee’s visit. An invitee entering a building with an interest in purchasing it might reasonably be expected to look at the basement. A dark stairway with several missing steps is not reasonably safe.

The court also sustains the demurrers of JSB and the brokers to plaintiff’s claim for negligence per se; a real estate agent engaged to sell property does not have a legal or equitable interest in it or control it for purposes of the Virginia Maintenance Code. I overrule FNMA’s demurrer to this claim.

The court sustains FNMA’s demurrer to a claim for nuisance; to allow a nuisance claim to proceed on these facts would confuse the causes of action.

Moran v. Fed. Nat’l Mtge. Ass’n (Martin) No. CL 10-6841, Nov. 21, 2011; Norfolk Cir. Ct.; Joseph J. Perez, Alexander K. Page, Herbert V. Kelly Jr., Stephen A. Horvath, R. Craig Gallagher for the parties. VLW 011-8-222, 5 pp.

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Tuesday, January 17, 2012

Divorce - Courts struggle with which parent should pay for private school in divorce

Courts struggle with which parent should pay for private school in divorce

By Peter Vieth
Published: January 16, 2012
Tags: Divorce Lawyer, , ,
 


The Virginia Court of Appeals offered guidelines 16 years ago for judges on when a spouse can be forced to pay for a child to attend private school.

But battles over tuition bills have continued in Virginia divorce courts.

When a parent questions the obligation to pay the extra money for private school, judges often have to parse vaguely worded domestic settlement agreements and probe family needs and traditions to make a ruling.

A new opinion from Warren County is the latest case to address the issue. The judge there gave a brief endorsement of public schools, a position in harmony with the standards set out by the appeals court in 1996.

In Sullivan v. Sullivan (VLW 011-8-228), Circuit Judge Dennis L. Hupp was faced with a mother who objected to sharing the cost of sending her 16-year-old daughter to Randolph Macon Academy.

The girl’s attendance at a private school was a point of conflict between the parties. Hupp was sympathetic to the mother’s plea. “The husband insisted on enrolling [the daughter] there over the wife’s objection at a time when the parties were experiencing serious financial difficulties. The public schools were apparently not considered as an option even though they serve the needs of thousands of young people quite well,” Hupp wrote.

The judge ordered only a minimal contribution by the mother to the girl’s education expenses. “A private school education was not a necessity. It was a choice the husband made for his daughter, and he must bear the cost of it for the most part,” Hupp wrote.

The Sullivan opinion is consistent with the direction of Solomond v. Ball, the seminal appeals court case from 1996. In Solomond, the Court of Appeals offered a list of factors for deciding whether a noncustodial parent should be required to contribute for a child’s private school expenses. The factors include the availability of satisfactory public schools, the child’s prior attendance at private school, the child’s special emotional or physical needs, religious training and family tradition.

The mother in Solomond sought to move the couple’s two sons from one private school to a more expensive academy. Even though the mother herself had attended the proposed new school and testified it was “the preferred institution,” the court found no need for the transfer. The Court of Appeals directed the trial court to roll back the father’s support obligation.

While many of the reported decisions involving private school tuition come from the populous areas of Eastern Virginia, one practitioner says it’s also a “big deal” in the Lynchburg area because of the popularity of a private school founded by the late Rev. Jerry Falwell.

Betsy H. Phillips of Rustburg said many parents enroll children at Lynchburg’s Liberty Christian Academy because the school promotes scholarships at Liberty University for those who achieve a certain grade level.
“It’s a gigantic deviation factor in child support,” Phillips said. “Judges are very reluctant to force a child to change school if they’re already enrolled and doing well,” she said.

Guided by the wisdom of Solomond, Virginia judges have sought to balance parental values and stability for children with financial realities faced by divorced parents. Here is a quick catalogue of how they have ruled:
  • Where a mother had authority under a prior order to make decisions about the children’s schooling, father did not oppose the choice of a parochial school, and father presented no evidence that the school was not in the child’s best interests, the trial court did not err in adding private tuition to the father’s child support obligation, the Court of Appeals held in 1997. Newland v. Newland, VLW 097-7-267.
  • Where the parties’ contract clearly required the father to pay only for a private institution deemed suitable and approved by both parents, the father could not be required to pay for his daughter’s tuition at Rice University, even though he agreed Rice was an appropriate school, the Court of Appeals said in 1997. Eissler v. Stange, VLW 097-7-160.
  • In another 1997 opinion, the Court of Appeals decided a father’s contention that he could no longer afford to send his children to private school, without more, failed to relieve him of his obligation to cover half of the school bills. The children had attended private schools throughout the parents’ marriage and were in the middle of the school year when the father sought a transfer to public schools. Even though the trial court had come to the same conclusion, however, the appeals court remanded the case with instructions that the trial judge provide written findings to support his order. Wheaton v. Wheaton, VLW 097-7-275.
  • Where the couple’s high school-age children had attended a private Christian school almost all of their academic careers, there was a demonstrated need for them to remain in that school, and where the parents had the ability to pay the bills, a circuit court judge refused to order the children removed from the school at the father’s request. The decision came in 1999 in a Caroline County case. Ratcliffe v. Ratcliffe, VLW 099-8-179.
  • A trial court rejected a mother’s bid for child support payments in excess of the statutory guidelines in light of the 13-year-old daughter’s enrollment in private school, finding the mother’s contributions to the marriage were an integral part of the couple’s lifestyle, which included private school for their offspring. The 2000 ruling came from Richmond Circuit Court in Hargrave v. Wienckowski, VLW 001-8-017.
  • Where a couple’s son was having troubles in public school that were evidently resolved with enrollment at a private military school, and the trial judge weighed the Solomond factors to decide the father should pay extra for the private education, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision in 2001. Not only were the father’s appeal arguments procedurally barred, the record reflected no reason to invoke the good cause or ends-of-justice exceptions, the court found in Dick v. Dick, VLW 001-7-569.
  • The Court of Appeals made it clear in 2002 that private school tuition is not considered a child care expense under the statutory guidelines in a case where the mother unilaterally enrolled the couple’s two children in Alexandria’s Bishop Ireton High School. Before their split, the couple had not sent either of their children to a private school, and the mother enrolled the children at Bishop Ireton without the father’s consent. The court remanded the case for recalculation of the father’s support obligation in Newland v. Newland, VLW 002-7-129.
  • Where a settlement agreement required the father to pay if the mother chose to send their child to a private school “subject to husband’s approval of such school which approval shall not be unreasonably withheld,” a Fairfax County circuit judge held the father was on the hook for secondary school and college tuition payments. That language did not give father a “veto” power, the judge found in Rosen v. Smith, VLW 002-8-250.
  • Even though the daughter had attended private school from kindergarten to grade three, a Chesterfield County circuit judge refused to break from the guidelines to order the father to help pay the private tuition. The judge found no family tradition for private schools, no special needs of the child, and no lack of satisfactory public schools in the 2003 case of Woodward v. Woodward, VLW 003-8-174.
  • A father could not escape his tuition obligation where he signed an agreement to pay half of the “educational costs” of his minor children, where he was aware the children were in private school at the time of the divorce and afterwards and where he failed to show inability to pay. The 2003 decision in Chesterfield County Circuit Court came in Brewerton v. O’Meara, VLW 003-7-464.
  • The Court of Appeals affirmed an order for a father to pay private school tuition in 2004 where the parties had agreed before their split that their daughter would attend private school and where the daughter had begun class for a new school year when the father signed an agreement to cover tuition. Owata v. Owata, VLW 004-7-193.
  • Even though the mother contended transferring to public school would disrupt the children’s education, the Court of Appeals found no support for that claim. The wife also failed to muster evidence to show a need – educational, emotional or developmental – to continue private education. The trial court’s refusal to deviate from the support guidelines to include the cost of private school was affirmed in the 2006 case of Lesesne v. Zablocki, VLW 006-7-002.
  • Lack of progress at a private school was a motivating factor for a Richmond circuit judge in a 2006. Where the mother and father clashed over whether a private Richmond school or public school programs in Tennessee would be best for a struggling 10-year-old, the judge looked to both the “unremarkable” progress the boy was making in the private school and at the couple’s tight finances. The decision awarded physical custody of the boy to the father in Tennessee in Beaty v. Beaty, VLW 007-8-025.
  • Finances were not an issue in a 2007 Loudoun County case, but the parents disagreed on a private daycare program. The father wanted to withdraw his son from Willow Montessori School because of a dispute over summer tuition, lack of transportation, and disapproval of the current program. The judge found the son was “doing very well” at Willow and the mother’s schedule allowed her to provide transportation. The judge found a “demonstrated need” for the child to continue at Willow in Stevens v. Stevens, VLW 007-8-113.
  • Where a settlement agreement referenced only a Montessori school without any other agreement for private school expenses, the Court of Appeals in August affirmed a trial court’s refusal to order tuition payments for other private schools. With only a written statement of facts, and no transcript, the record was deemed insufficient to consider the mother’s claim that it was in the child’s best interest to change schools. Lewis v. Bailey, VLW 011-7-260.
Please contact us if you need help:

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Friday, January 13, 2012

No homicide charge for SIDS daycare death

No homicide charge for SIDS daycare death

By Deborah Elkins
Published: January 4, 2012
Tags: , , Criminal Defense Attorney,
 


A Norfolk Circuit Court has dismissed felony homicide charges against the director of a church daycare center where a seven-week old infant died of Sudden Infant Death Syndrome.

Norfolk Circuit Judge Charles E. Poston said showing the center ignored SIDS risk factors such as placing an infant on its stomach to sleep, did not provide a basis for a homicide charge.

His Jan. 3 decision in Commonwealth v. Futrell is the first reported case construing Virginia’s statute codifying SIDS, Virginia Code § 32.1-285.1, Poston wrote. On his own motion, the judge reconsidered charges he allowed last September, and decided the provider could not be criminally liable for the baby’s unexplained death.

Defendant Tammy Futrell was director of the Little Eagles Day Care, a childcare center affiliated with the Bethel Temple Church of Deliverance in Norfolk when seven-week old Dylan Cummings died on May 25, 2010. As a religiously affiliated center, Little Eagles was exempt from state regulation and licensure.

That morning, Center employee Juanita Bell noticed the baby was “trying to catch his breath” while lying on his stomach, but Bell told no one. She left the center for a doctor’s appointment, so that employee Dinnetta Feeney remained as the sole caretaker for 10 infants.

Feeney placed Dylan on his stomach to sleep, “as was the practice at Little Eagles,” Poston wrote. “The room was warm, stuffy, very small and dark, and Dylan’s crib consisted of two foam pads and an ill-fitting sheet,” the opinion said. At 11:30 a.m., Feeney went to lunch, out of eyesight and earshot of Dylan, although she did occasionally check on the babies. At 2:00 p.m., Feeney found Dylan lifeless, with “vomit or liquid” coming out of his mouth. An autopsy determined SIDS was the cause of death.

The prosecutor offered an expert witness to testify that the risk of SIDS death “increased significantly” because the daycare director allowed her employees to engage in risky behavior.

But Poston said a jury could not find that any act by Futrell or her employees was a proximate cause of Dylan’s death, even if their actions “increased the risk factors associated with SIDS.”

There “can be no proximate cause of death when SIDS is the sole cause of death because, by definition, no legal or medical cause of death can be ascertained,” he said.

Exposing an infant to SIDS risk factors cannot be used to prove proximate cause, the court concluded.

Thursday, January 12, 2012

Nature of gifts at issue in couple's divorce

Nature of gifts at issue in couple’s divorce

By Paul Fletcher
Published: January 5, 2012
Tags: , , Divorce Attorney,
 

When a wife’s father said that a $15,000 payment was for “y’all,” he made a joint gift to the couple, despite his later testimony that he intended only to help his daughter.

Henrico Circuit Judge Daniel T. Balfour had to weigh a number of gifts in Polich v. Polich (VLW 011-8-232) to determine whether they were separate or joint.

The $15,000 gift was used for an improvement to the jointly owned house and garage in suburban Richmond.

The Poliches, Balfour wrote, were both in their 50s, with one remaining child at home, a senior at Mills Godwin High School. The marriage had been deteriorating for some time until they sought a divorce.

The money for the home improvement was one of a number of gifts the wife’s father made over the years to his daughter.

A car he gave her was a gift  only to her. But in 1998 the dad paid a $12,500 credit card debt. The debt was incurred by both parties with different purchases and the payment benefitted both, so it was a gift to both, Balfour held.

Also, the wife said that she had thanked her father for his assistance to “us,” the judge said.

But cash gifts of $10,000, clearly made to qualify for the gift tax exemption, were separate.

Balfour parsed through these gifts and other monies received through the years (including a large inheritance the wife received upon her mother’s death) to determine the respective portions of the marital home, which he found was hybrid property due to the parties’ respective financial contributions.

Old boyfriend 

Balfour said that neither of the parties was entitled to receive an award of attorney’s fees from the other.

However, he did order the wife to pay $3,000 for the attorney’s fees of a college boyfriend of the wife. The husband had subpoenaed him to appear in the case.

Balfour wrote that “immediately prior to, during and after the separation,” the wife reconnected with this man, talking and texting him for over six hours over a two-month period.

The wife testified there was no physical relationship and that she had only a close an “advisory” relationship with him, seeking advice about a divorce lawyer and other matters.

Balfour said that given the “numerous text messages and innumerable telephone conversations,” the husband “had reason to be concerned.”

It would be “incongruous” to require him to pay the man’s legal fees. Balfour said that expense she be borne by the wife.

Tuesday, January 10, 2012

One toke over the line

One toke over the line

January 9th, 2012 · No Comments · Criminal Defense AttorneyEmployment Law

    A federal judge cited that ‘70s anthem last week when he decided a mine worker who hadn’t toked up since high school should get a chance to return to work.

    Employer Dickenson-Russell Coal Company had a strict “zero tolerance” drug policy that called for random screening and disciplinary sanctions ranging up to termination. After the policy went into effect in 2006, three employees at the Cherokee Mine tested positive for drugs and each was terminated. The union did not arbitrate any of those terminations.

    Robert Gilbert worked in the coal industry for 32 years, and his work for D-R involved electrical and mechanical repair and was “safety sensitive.”

    On Sept. 23, 2010, Gilbert was playing poker with two buddies when one of them pulled out a joint.

    “Although he had not smoked marijuana since high school, Gilbert ‘toked it’ twice,” Big Stone Gap U.S.

    District Judge James P. Jones wrote in Dickenson-Russell Coal Co. v. Int’l Union, UMW. A footnote defined “toke,” with reference to Merriam-Webster and the song by Michael Brewer and Tom Shipley.

    As luck would have it, Gilbert faced a random drug screen the next day, his fourth test that year. He tested positive and the company suspended him with intent to discharge.

    When the union took the matter to arbitration, the arbitrator said Gilbert’s lengthy clean work record made him the “poster boy” for mitigating circumstances that supported a lesser penalty. The arbitrator directed that Gilbert be reinstated without his six months of back pay. The coal company refused to reinstate Gilbert and the case went to court.

    Jones upheld the award for Gilbert, saying the company drug policy did not require termination as the only possible punishment and reinstatement did not violate public policy.

    By Deborah Elkins

    Monday, January 09, 2012

    Father Must Pay Attorney’s Fee

    Father Must Pay Attorney’s Fee

    By Deborah Elkins
    Published: January 5, 2012

    Tags: , Family Law Attorney, ,
     
    The Court of Appeals affirms the circuit court’s award of child custody and $20,000 in attorney’s fees to mother; father released his counsel after being warned no continuance would be granted.

    Husband and wife separated in 2007, after four years of marriage and one month after the birth of their child. Father filed for divorce in 2007. After numerous motions and several hearings, a final hearing was scheduled for May 2010; this hearing had to be continued to March 2011 due to father’s noncompliance with discovery. On the rescheduled hearing date, father’s counsel moved to withdraw; father requested to discharge his counsel and asked for a 30-day continuance. Father’s request was opposed by mother and the guardian ad litem as not in the child’s best interest. The trial court warned father no continuance would be granted if he released his counsel. Father released his counsel and represented himself at the hearing. The trial court awarded mother sole custody and ordered father to pay $20,000 in attorney’s fees. Mother documented fees exceeding $32,000. Father retained counsel after the hearing who filed motion to reconsider that resulted in adjusting the amount and start date of child support and extending the payment period for mother’s attorney’s fees from 12 to 24 months.

    On appeal, father argues the trial court abused its discretion in denying a continuance and awarding $20,000 attorney’s fees to mother. We find no abuse of discretion in the circumstances of this case. The trial court instructed and explained to father several times to carefully consider his request to discharge his attorney because a continuance was not in the child’s best interests. Father’s counsel moved to withdraw based on “extraordinary circumstances” making him ineffective due to father’s refusal to communicate. We will not consider father’s new arguments about unique circumstances (his upbringing, religion and employment and unpreparedness), fair trial, due process and “family integrity.” Father failed to preserve these arguments by raising them in the trial court as required Rule 5A:18. We also will not consider father’s argument about his right to cross-examine and present evidence. Father cites no authority to support his argument as required by Rule 5A:20(e) and this noncompliance is significant; it is father’s burden to show reversible error. Father shows no abuse of discretion in the award of attorney’s fees to mother. Mother documented attorney’s fees exceeding the $20,000 awarded. The trial court considered the disparity in the parties’ income, the longevity and complexity of the case and commented that the attorney’s fees may be somewhat reflective of the nature of the parties involved. We decline mother’s request for attorney’s fees on appeal.

    Dajani v. Dajani (Per Curiam) No. 0905-11-2, Dec. 6, 2011; Spotsylvania Cir. Ct. (Beck) Ted Kavrukov for appellant; Kristie L. Kane for appellee; Jeannette B. Purvis, guardian ad litem. VLW 011-7-385(UP), 8 pp.