Virginia Legal Trends and More

Wednesday, December 28, 2011

'Access' form for tree removal was not written contract

‘Access’ form for tree removal was not written contract

Dec 16th, 2011 by Deborah Elkins

Tag: Charlottesville Attorney

A property owner who signed an “Asset and Authorization Card” to allow a contractor to remove storm-damaged trees was not bound by a written contract, the Supreme Court of Virginia says.

In a Dec. 9 unpublished order in Hall & Wilson Construction Inc. v. Bowers, No. 101566, the high court upheld a Chesterfield County Circuit Court decision that the parties had an oral contract and the statute of limitations had run on the contractor’s $74,375 claim against the owner.

Owner Charlie Bowers signed a printed form that granted Hall permission to come onto the property to remove trees damaged during a 2003 tropical storm and to secure the house. The form also stated the homeowner would be the “responsible party for payment should they receive payment direct from insurance company.”

The Supreme Court faulted the form for its failure to show an agreement to repair the house or just remove the downed trees and its failure to identify whether Hall should remove all downed trees or only those from the house. The form also didn’t state whether Hall should repair damage caused the fallen trees apart from repair to the house, or account for the amount, time and manner of payment.

By Deborah Elkins

As always, please consult with a Virginia attorney about legal issues raised in this article. Every situation is unique.

Tucker Griffin Barnes - Where deep insight equals powerful advantage.

Tucker Griffin Barnes P.C.

Charlottesville, Virginia

434-973-7474

Wednesday, December 21, 2011

Mom can get QDRO for child support

December 20th, 2011 · No Comments · Child Support, Family Law Attorney, Domestic Relations

A mother could attach a father’s federal retirement account to collect a child support arrearage, the Virginia Court of Appeals said today.

It did not matter that the mother had waived any personal interest in the retirement account in a premarital agreement, the appellate panel said. In Nkopchieu v. Minlend, the panel reversed an Alexandria trial court decision that rejected the mother’s request for a Qualified Domestic Relations Order to pursue the $28,000 arrearage for the couple’s two children.

Citing Hoy v. Hoy,the father’s lawyer argued the mother could not “recast” her child support claim into a circumstance for entering a QDRO.

Judge Randolph A. Beales said the father had “completely ignored and frustrated the trial court’s child support orders” and had apparently left the country. The retirement account was the mother’s only means of obtaining support. The panel rejected the trial court’s ruling that Hoy prevented it from entering a QDRO to satisfy the child support arrearage.

Beales emphasized that the mother sought to vindicate the children’s right to child support, not any personal property right that might have accrued to the mother during the parties’ marriage. The mother asked for a QDRO while the divorce proceedings were active; she was not trying to reopen a case to substantively modify the terms of a divorce decree, as in Hoy.

The appellate court reversed and remanded the case for the trial court to determine whether the mother’s draft QDRO met ERISA technical requirements.

By Deborah Elkins

As always, please consult with a Virginia attorney about legal issues raised in this article. Every situation is unique.

Tucker Griffin Barnes - Where deep insight equals powerful advantage.

Tucker Griffin Barnes P.C.

Charlottesville, Virginia

434-973-7474

Tuesday, December 20, 2011

A charge that's not a crime

A charge that’s not a crime
Drivers ticketed for ‘driving without proof of insurance’

By Peter Vieth
Published: December 19, 2011

Tags: General District Courts, Tucker Griffin Barnes, Traffic Offenses

Virginia drivers are being charged and convicted of an offense that is not a crime under state law: driving without proof of insurance.

The General Assembly has debated the issue at least three times, but in each instance, a bill to require drivers to carry an insurance card or other proof of insurance has failed. Nonetheless, in several localities, drivers have been hit with hefty fines and court costs for failing to have proof of insurance, according to court records.

A Lynchburg lawyer was steamed when he was charged for not having an insurance card when he was stopped as he drove through Sussex County over Labor Day. He could have folded like some people do when a police officer issues a citation. But he went back to Sussex in November to fight and told the judge that he has been charged with a non-existent crime. The judge has not yet ruled in the case.

Virginia law does not even require a driver to have insurance. Owners can opt to pay a $500 uninsured motor vehicle fee to the Department of Motor Vehicles. Failure either to insure your car or pay the fee is a Class 3 misdemeanor, punishable by fines of up to $500, according to Virginia Code § 46.2-707.

The statute provides the same penalty for falsely verifying insurance and related infractions, but it does not make it an offense to drive without proof of auto insurance, lawyers confirmed.

Some Virginia police officers – both state and local – are misinformed about Virginia auto insurance law.

A state police spokesperson said troopers can and do charge drivers with failure to have proof of insurance under Code § 46.2-707.

State troopers routinely ask for a driver’s license, registration and insurance card during a traffic stop or crash investigation, according to Corinne N. Geller, Virginia State Police public relations director. Based on the response from the driver when asked about insurance, she said, troopers can either charge under Code § 46.2-707 or require the driver to use a form to provide proof of insurance to the DMV within 30 days.

Court records show local police have written tickets for “no proof of insurance” in Colonial Heights and Prince William, Sussex and Dinwiddie counties. One driver was fined $100 plus $10 in court costs after being found guilty in Sussex County in May.

A Richmond prosecutor acknowledged some insured drivers in that city are charged for failure to have an insurance card. The charge is dismissed when the driver brings the proof of insurance to court, the prosecutor said in an email forwarded by Commonwealth’s Attorney Michael Herring.

The Lynchburg lawyer charged in Sussex County, M. Paul Valois, decided to fight because the stakes are high for a conviction under Code § 46.2-707. The violation is a Class 3 misdemeanor, and making any false statement a “crime of moral turpitude,” Valois said. Once that conviction is on someone’s record, it could affect future employment or military service. For those reasons, Valois said, “I’ve got to fight it.”

There’s even more at stake. Other lawyers point out that a conviction under Code § 46.2-707 brings immediate license suspension by the DMV and requires payment of the $500 and proof of financial responsibility.

Valois may have a valid defense. Attorneys who reviewed the statute agreed it does not criminalize failure to have an insurance card in your car.

“Not having proof of insurance is not an offense in Virginia. It’s just incorrect,” said G. Barton Chucker of Richmond, a traffic defense lawyer.

Chucker also serves as a substitute judge hearing traffic cases in Richmond. He said the issue comes up every time he sits on the traffic court bench. He added he has seen a handful of police officers in Richmond who try to charge motorists with failing to have proof of insurance. He said he simply tells prosecutors, “It’s not the law.”

“The offense is not driving an uninsured motor vehicle,” agreed Lynchburg Commonwealth’s Attorney Michael R. Doucette. “The offense also is not failure to have proof of insurance while operating the vehicle on the highways. Virginia allows the operation of uninsured motor vehicles on the highways,” he said.

“Rather, the offense is having an uninsured motor vehicle and not paying the uninsured motorist fee of $500 per year,” Doucette said.

Chucker, Doucette and other attorneys agree that if a driver tells an officer there is no insurance on the car and he has not paid the $500 fee, the driver has earned himself a valid ticket.

“My guess as to where the confusion arises is everyone assumes that if a person had the $500 to pay the uninsured motorist fee, he would get at least a minimal insurance policy instead. So, if a motorist tells a law enforcement officer that he has no insurance, the officer presumes that he also has not paid the uninsured motorist fee,” Doucette said.

Doucette said requiring drivers to present either proof of insurance or proof of payment of the uninsured vehicle fee would go a long way to clear up the confusion.

Richmond traffic lawyer Bob Battle said it’s possible to make a mistake and misread the statute. “My guess is it is an officer who got out his little Virginia Code summary book and looked at the title of 46.2-707 and looked at the words ‘verification of insurance’ and missed the word ‘uninsured’ before ‘vehicle,’” Battle said.
And many drivers may be making a mistake as well, just assuming that proof of insurance is required. “People don’t know they don’t have to show the insurance card,” said Fredericksburg traffic lawyer Andrew F. Flusche.

As always, please consult with a Virginia attorney about legal issues raised in this article. Every situation is unique.

Tucker Griffin Barnes - Where deep insight equals powerful advantage.

Tucker Griffin Barnes P.C.

Charlottesville, Virginia

434-973-7474

Thursday, December 15, 2011

Toughness doesn't always come in a pinstripe suit...

Husband's family farm is 'marital'

Husband’s Family Farm is ‘Marital’

By Deborah Elkins
Published: December 15, 2011

Tags: Domestic Relations, Tucker Griffin Barnes, Judge Robert J. Humphreys, Virginia Court of Appeals

When husband and wife sold their home and purchased the 19-acre family farm in Nelson County from a trust set up by husband’s parents to hold the farm as property for their four sons, the farm became marital property and the Court of Appeals upholds classification of the farm as marital property.

On appeal, husband contends the farm should have been classified as part marital, part separate, since he separately “owned” a one-fourth interest in the farm with his three brothers after his parent sold it to a trust.

Under Va. Code § 20-107.3(A)(3), to the extent property is retraceable by a preponderance of the evidence and was not a gift, the retitled property shall retain its original classification. When marital property and separate property are commingled into newly acquired property resulting in the loss of identity of the contributing properties, the commingled property shall be deemed transmuted to marital property.

The question here is whether husband successfully retraced one quarter of the farm to his separate property by a preponderance of the evidence.

Husband initially approached his mother seeking to purchase the farm. She agreed and directed the trust to sell the farm. In Virginia, a trustee is required to administer a trust and invest trust assets in good faith, in accordance with its terms and purposes. A trustee, without authorization by a court, may exercise powers conferred by the terms of the trust.

In this case, the farm was initially conveyed to the trust and therefore was governed by its terms.

Specifically, the terms of the trust required that the trustee hold all real property, for the parents’ lifetime or until such other time as the parents, jointly, or the survivor of them instructs the trustee to sell or otherwise distribute the trust assets as herein provided. Thus, upon instruction from the parents to sell the farm to husband and wife, the trustee was obligated to comply.

Ultimately, the sale of the farm was executed between the parents, the brother who served as trustee and husband and wife. Thus, at a minimum, the farm became transmuted, untraced marital property following the sale. At this point the farm was no longer an asset of the trust and therefore was not subject to any of its terms. The trust provision governing distribution of the farm as a trust asset upon the parents’ death became irrelevant and husband could not receive any interest in the farm through the trust. Under the plain terms of the trust, the brothers would only receive an equal share of the remaining trust assets upon the deaths of both parents. In other words, the trust gave the brothers a vested remainder in the trust assets that would not ripen into actual title until the deaths of the parents. By removing the property from trust assets, husband and brothers no longer had a future interest in the farm, and husband and wife thereafter possessed the farm as marital property.

The evidence also does not support husband’s contention that one-fourth of the farm was given to him as a gift. The farm was paid for using the proceeds of the sale of husband and wife’s house. Though the contract price was $100,000 and the note evidencing the debt for purchase of the farm was only for $75,000, this merely suggests there was a forgiveness of $25,000 in debt.

Because the farm was sold to husband and wife jointly, and husband did not inherit or receive the property as a gift, the circuit court did not err in finding it was marital property.

Stevens v. Stevens (Humphreys) No. 0498-11-3, Dec. 13, 2011; Nelson County Cir.Ct. (Gamble) Linda S. Jones for appellant; C. Lynn Lawson for appellee. VLW 011-7-393, 8 pp.

Tuesday, December 13, 2011

Long distance romance not cohabitation

Long Distance Romance Not Cohabitation

By Deborah Elkins
Published: December 13, 2011

Tags: Domestic Relations,Tucker Griffin Barnes, Judge William G. Petty, Virginia Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals affirms in part and reverses in part a trial court decision refusing to terminate spousal support and modifying child support without considering child support paid in arrears; husband’s evidence does not prove cohabitation under the parties’ agreement but the trial court erred in refusing to consider husband’s spousal support paid totaling $80,000 in modifying child support.

Husband and wife have three children and divorced in 2007 by a final decree incorporating a 2006 letter agreement providing permanent monthly child support of $2,000 and spousal support of $8,000, subject to termination if wife remarried or cohabitated in a situation analogous to marriage with a person of opposite sex for a year or more. In 2009, husband moved to modify child support based on changed circumstances: his income declined from $739,554 in 2006 to $6,666 monthly in 2010. He also moved to terminate spousal support based on wife’s longstanding romantic relationship with a boyfriend who lived Los Angeles. In 2010, husband paid wife $80,000 in spousal support for 2009 arrearages.

Wife is employed as a flight attendant. She and her boyfriend sometimes visit each other but neither has a key to the other’s residence. Following a hearing, the trial court refused to terminate spousal support but modified child support without considering spousal support paid.

On appeal, husband argues sufficient evidence proves cohabitation. We disagree. Our cases interpret cohabitation to require living together in the same house continuously or with some permanency, mutually assuming marital duties and obligations. Four factors are considered: (1) common residence; (2) intimate or romantic involvement; (3) provision of financial support; and (4) duration and continuity of relationship and other indicia of permanency. Applying this framework, we cannot say the trial court erred in finding wife and her boyfriend do not cohabit in a situation analogous to marriage. They do not share the same residence or keys to each other’s separate residences; storing a few personal items does not amount to sharing a residence.

We agree with husband that the trial court erred in refusing to consider his spousal support payments of $80,000 in modifying child support. Section 20-108.2(C) expressly requires considering spousal support in gross income for determining child support, including it in the recipient spouse’s income and excluding it from the payor’s. The irregularity of the payments does not allowing excluding them but irregularity can be considered in determining whether to deviate from the statutory guideline amount. We reject wife’s argument that the trial permissibly deviated from the statutory guideline amount because the trial court failed to comply with the statutory requirement to state the amount required under the guidelines. We reverse and remand for a determination of child support complying with the statute.

Cranwell v. Cranwell (Petty) No. 2677-10-4, Dec. 6, 2011; Arlington Cir. Ct. (Brown) Robert J. Surovell for appellant; Michael A. Ward for appellee. VLW 011-7-383, 11 pp.

As always, please consult with a Virginia attorney about legal issues raised in this article. Every situation is unique.

Tucker Griffin Barnes - Where deep insight equals powerful advantage.

Tucker Griffin Barnes P.C.

Charlottesville, Virginia

434-973-7474

Thursday, December 08, 2011

Delayed diagnosis leads to $2.65M verdict

By Peter Vieth
Published: December 8, 2011
Tag: Tucker Griffin Barnes

A Fairfax County jury has returned a $2.65 million verdict against a radiologist whose admitted negligence led to a delay in diagnosis of breast cancer for a 54-year-old woman, even though the woman had no additional medical bills and continued to work at the time of trial.

Arlington lawyer William E. Artz, the patient’s attorney, said the size of the Nov. 11 verdict is mostly attributable to the mental anguish suffered by the woman, who now faces an increased risk of the spread of cancer and a reduced life expectancy.

The radiologist conceded she was negligent in failing to spot the cancer as alleged in the complaint, Artz said. She defended the case solely on the issue of causation, with experts who testified that a 13-month delay in diagnosis did not change the expected outcome for the patient, according to Artz.

The case centered on a screening mammogram performed on Sept. 15, 2008. The radiologist missed a left breast abnormality and failed to order follow-up imaging studies or a referral for a biopsy, which would have revealed the breast cancer in time for curative treatment, Artz said.

The patient returned to the radiologist for her annual screening mammogram 13 months later. A focal symmetry in the left breast appeared more prominent. A diagnostic mammogram and ultrasound showed two masses in the left breast. A left breast biopsy revealed Stage IIIA breast cancer.

The patient underwent neo-adjuvant chemotherapy, a left quadrantectomy with reconstruction, radiation and hormone therapy. At the time of trial, there was no evidence of metastasis.

As a result of the misread mammogram, there was a 13-month delay in the diagnosis and treatment of the patient’s breast cancer. The delay allowed the cancer to progress from a curable (Stage IIA or IIB) to an incurable (Stage IIIB or IIIC), the plaintiff alleged. Artz said the tumor grew from 2.5 cm to 8 cm during the 13 months.

The defense experts argued that the breast cancer was slow-growing with no evidence of metastasis at the time of trial. They relied in part on Adjuvant Online, a computer database used by oncologists to determine a patient’s likely 10-year prognosis with chemotherapy after initial treatment, Artz said.

According to the defense experts, the patient had a 10-year survival rate of up to 70 percent. The plaintiff’s experts contended her 10-year survival rate was only 35 percent.

Despite her cancer diagnosis, the plaintiff continued to work, so there were no past lost wages. Since the plaintiff would have required the same treatment if her cancer had been timely diagnosed, there were no past medical bills.

The verdict was based solely on mental anguish and future medical expenses, Artz said. Both the patient and her husband testified about her fears for the future. “From a jury’s perspective, I think the mental anguish component is a fairly obvious one, even without her testimony,” Artz said.

The plaintiff’s experts estimated $250,000 to $300,000 in future medical bills attributable to the delayed diagnosis. Artz said he asked the jury for $2.5 million for mental anguish.

The four-woman, three-man jury deliberated for an hour and a half before returning the verdict for $2.65 million, Artz said.

Defense lawyers Richard L. Nagle and Travis W. Markley of Fairfax contend in a post-trial motion that the verdict is excessive, according to Artz. But he disagrees. “You are taking away 25 percent of a patient’s life with this conceded negligence,” he said.

Nagle could not be reached for comment by press time.

As always, please consult with a Virginia attorney about legal issues raised in this article. Every situation is unique.

Tucker Griffin Barnes - Where deep insight equals powerful advantage.

Tucker Griffin Barnes P.C.

Charlottesville, Virginia

434-973-7474

Wednesday, December 07, 2011

Court issues 'actual innocence' writ

Court issues ‘actual innocence’ writ

December 6th, 2011 · Tucker Griffin Barnes, No Comments · Uncategorized

The en banc Virginia Court of Appeals today issued a writ of actual innocence to Thomas Haynesworth, a Richmond man who spent nearly three decades in prison for at least one rape he didn’t commit.

An appellate panel heard Haynesworth’s case in March, and the en banc court took up the matter last July.

Today the full court granted Haynesworth’s petitions under Virginia Code Sec. 19.2-327.13 and vacated Haynesworth’s convictions.

The court’s decision was not unanimous. Judge Larry G. Elder filed an 11-page dissent, joined by Judge William G. Petty. Judge Randolph A. Beales and Judge Robert J. Humphreys filed separate dissents.

By Deborah Elkins

As always, please consult with a Virginia attorney about legal issues raised in this article. Every situation is unique.

Tucker Griffin Barnes - Where deep insight equals powerful advantage.

Tucker Griffin Barnes P.C.

Charlottesville, Virginia

434-973-7474

Monday, December 05, 2011

Traffic-fine fight pits state against localities

By Peter Vieth
Published: November 4, 2011

Tags: General Assembly, Tucker Griffin Barnes, Traffic Offenses

Complaints about “speed traps” may prompt the Virginia General Assembly to recalibrate how the state and various localities divide the money that goes with the traffic fines.

Under longstanding practice, Virginia’s local governments have passed their own traffic laws, which frequently correspond to state traffic statutes. Local prosecutors can choose to proceed under local law, which keeps the money from fines – several million dollars a year for some localities – in local coffers.

A new state auditor’s report questions the general practice and the revenue split.

The September report from Auditor of Public Accounts Walter Kucharski has legislators scrutinizing local budgets that explicitly rely on catching speeding motorists.

“Some jurisdictions have gotten a reputation for establishing budgets based on income generated by individual police activities … that winds up paying for salaries and equipment,” said Sen. John Watkins, R-Midlothian, a member of the Senate Finance Committee.

Hopewell is one locality that has planned on drivers being in a hurry. The city council approved a plan in 2007 to hire two part-time deputies to write speeding tickets on a two-mile stretch of Interstate 295. The project, detailed in council meeting minutes, was expected to bring in $500,000 to $1 million per year. The costs of the police car and officer salaries would be paid for in the first four to six weeks of the program, a report to the city council estimated.

After hearing the state auditor’s report last month, some members of the Senate Finance Committee are considering possible curbs on how localities can use the local fines and costs, one senator said.

For many local governments, there is big money at stake. In the fiscal year ending in June 2010, the audit shows courts collected $95 million in fines and costs from enforcement of local ordinances, mostly traffic laws that parallel the state traffic code. Local governments have a free hand in how they use that money.

By contrast, money from fines and costs related to state statutes goes to the state treasury, much of it earmarked for teacher retirement and school construction.

The auditor’s report has raised concerns among local government officials that the General Assembly might have its eye on the money they get from local ordinances.

Kucharski said the practice of allowing localities to pass local versions of state laws developed over the years without any analysis of what happens to the money paid by defendants. “People in the Courts of Justice Committees are adding this language without considering the impact on the Literary Fund or the general fund,” he said.

But there may be more specific issues involved in local ordinances. Watkins, who proposed the auditor’s study, said one of his concerns is the classic “speed trap” – local traffic enforcement activities designed to fill local coffers rather than enhance traffic safety.

The state audit shows the city of Emporia and surrounding Greensville County collected more than $2.9 million in local fines and costs in fiscal 2010. Internet postings suggest many motorists consider that area, where Interstate 95 intersects with U.S. 58, to be a speed trap.

Richmond traffic lawyer Robert E. Battle said the Hopewell officers patrol a section of highway where the speed limit is 70 miles per hour. Under Virginia law, anyone clocked over 80 can be charged with the crime of reckless driving. “It’s like spearing fish in a barrel,” Battle said.

The audit shows Hopewell collected more than the anticipated $1 million in local fines and costs in fiscal 2010.

Basing traffic enforcement on revenue estimates is not good government, Watkins said. “To me that calls into question the legal reputation of the enforcement and prosecution,” he said. “That’s not what justice is all about.”

Watkins said he also is concerned about the amount of money diverted from the state’s school fund as more and more localities have enacted local ordinances to beef up their budgets.

Fines and costs for state law violations go to the state Literary Fund, which contributes to teacher retirement and school construction, whereas money from local ordinance enforcement can be used by the local government for any purpose.

Watkins said some legislators hope to change how localities are allowed to use the money from local ordinances. “I think there’s a lot of people interested at Senate Finance,” he said.

The Virginia Municipal League wasted no time defending spending practices for local ordinance revenue. VML executive director R. Michael Amyx fired off a letter to Kurcharski while the audit report was still in preparation, listing the ways localities use the money for courts and law enforcement.

Localities spend roughly half of the local revenue for education, according to Neal Menkes, VML’s director of fiscal policy. That’s far more than what the state contributes, he said.

Menkes also says there is arguably a stronger local interest in traffic violations than state interest.
“Ultimately, for all localities, any reduction of revenues from fines and fees will put more pressure on real estate and personal property tax rates,” said Roger C. Wiley, a Richmond lawyer with extensive local government experience.

Wiley also points out local governments have to pay for lawyers for indigent defendants facing jail time when local criminal ordinances are enforced, so state costs of prosecution would increase if local ordinances were eliminated.

Portsmouth Circuit Court Clerk Cynthia P. Morrison, president of the Virginia Court Clerks’ Association, fears a loss of local fine revenue. As state funding decreased in recent years, “many of us had to rely on localities to step up to the plate,” she said.

Del. Scott Surovell, D-Fairfax, who is both a state legislator and a traffic defense lawyer, said localities such as Fairfax provide significant sums for court and law enforcement operations. The county government pays for judicial clerks, staff in the commonwealth’s attorney’s office, and police resources.

“I suspect a lot of jurisdictions are putting more in than they’re taking out in fine revenue,” Surovell said.
Nevertheless, Surovell said he was troubled by the suggestion some traffic enforcement operations were created just to raise money. “I think that’s kind of abhorrent,” he said, comparing it to speed cameras that generate fines without regard to driver points.

“It’s why a lot of people don’t trust the system to be fair and honest,” he said. “The whole thing raises a lot of interesting public policy issues.”

As always, please consult with a Virginia attorney about legal issues raised in this article. Every situation is unique.

Tucker Griffin Barnes - Where deep insight equals powerful advantage.

Tucker Griffin Barnes P.C.

Charlottesville, Virginia

434-973-7474

Thursday, December 01, 2011

DUI defense: blame it on the flip-flops

November 30th, 2011 · No Comments · Court of Appeals, Tucker Griffin Barnes, DUI/TRAFFIC/CRIMINAL

Here’s a DUI defense we haven’t seen before: the Flip-Flop Defense.

A York County driver claimed that as he drove out a restaurant parking lot, he got his flip-flop wedged against the accelerator, causing his 1999 Chevy Blazer to go out of control and flip onto its roof. A modern-day multi-tasker, Kegan Bilger also was trying to put a “chew” of tobacco in his mouth when he lost control of his car.

Of course, there was also that matter of the four 22-ounce beers Bilger drank at the restaurant, with only a bowl of chowder to soak up the alcohol.

At trial, Bilger tried to keep out the certificate of blood analysis showing a 0.11 percent blood alcohol content. The trial judge said the certificate didn’t really matter, as the circumstantial evidence and Bilger’s admission to drinking the four beers made a prima facie showing that he was driving under influence.

York County Circuit Court Judge Designate Robert W. Curran convicted Bilger under Virginia Code § 18.2-266, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction yesterday in an unpublished opinion.

Evidence supporting the conviction included photos of the accident scene, Bilger’s admission to drinking 88 ounces of brew and the fact that he flipped his vehicle within a six-parking space span and emerged with glass fragments in his eye, but called his insurance company first.

By Deborah Elkins

As always, please consult with a Virginia attorney about legal issues raised in this article. Every situation is unique.

Tucker Griffin Barnes - Where deep insight equals powerful advantage.

Tucker Griffin Barnes P.C.

Charlottesville, Virginia

434-973-7474