Friday, July 29, 2011

Supreme Court Rules Children Entitled to More Than Standard Miranda Warnings

Supreme Court Rules Children Entitled to More Than Standard Miranda Warnings
Doug Plank—Senior Attorney, Criminal Law (dplank@nlrg.com)

Again revisiting the now 45-year-old decision of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Supreme Court recently held in a 5-4 decision that police officers must warn children of their Miranda rights in situations in which adults might not be required to be warned.  J.D.B. v. North Carolina, No. 09-11121, 2011 WL 2369508 (U.S. June 16, 2011)In a majority decision by the most recently appointed Justice, Justice Sonia Sotomayor, the Court ruled that children are not just "miniature adults" and that children must be treated differently from adults by police when evaluating whether Miranda warnings are required.

The case arose after a 13-year-old boy was asked by school authorities to leave a classroom to talk to police about a burglary.  The boy was interrogated intensely for 30 minutes by two school administrators and two policemen, and he ultimately confessed to the crime.  Although the boy was purportedly told during the interrogation that he was free to go, he was also told that he could help himself by being cooperative, and he continued to provide details of the crime after he had been told that he could leave.

When the boy was subsequently prosecuted for the burglary, his attorney argued that the confession was invalid and inadmissible because it had been obtained while the boy was "in custody" for purposes of Miranda but had not been advised of his rights.  However, the trial court held otherwise, and its ruling was upheld by the North Carolina Supreme Court in In re J.D.B., 686 S.E.2d 135 (N.C. 2009), which "decline[d] to extend the test for custody to include consideration of the age and academic standing of an individual subjected to questioning by police."  Id. at 140.

Sotomayor's majority opinion for the Supreme Court noted that the Court has always required police officers and courts to examine all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, including any circumstance that "'would have affected how a reasonable person in [the suspect's] position would perceive his or her freedom to leave.'"  2011 WL 2369508, at *6 (quoting Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 325 (1994)).  The majority then concluded that a child's age would indeed affect how a reasonable person in the suspect's position would perceive his or her freedom to leave, because "a reasonable child subjected to police questioning will sometimes feel pressured to submit when a reasonable adult would feel free to go."  Id. at *7.

Justice Alito wrote a dissenting opinion in which he criticized the majority for adding another factor for police officers to consider when questioning a suspect and for failing to provide any meaningful guidance to lower courts in deciding whether police officers have adequately considered the age of a suspect.










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Wednesday, July 27, 2011

Consensus lacking on response to decline in jury trials

Consensus lacking on response to decline in jury trials

By Peter Vieth
Published: July 27, 2011

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HOT SPRINGS–Lawyers and judges lament the decline in the number of jury trials, but find little common ground on what to do about the trend – or whether anything needs to be done at all.

“If you lose the jury trial, the system dies,” said Virginia Supreme Court Justice Donald W. Lemons, expressing a sentiment shared by several others at a Virginia Bar Association session at the group’s summer meeting at The Homestead.

“The public doesn’t know what’s happening. We need a massive education program to tell them,” said David J. Beck, former president of the American College of Trial Lawyers.

But a litigation official at a major regional bank said sometimes it just makes sense to settle cases rather than take them to trial. “If I can buy certainty and finality for something around my risk cost, why wouldn’t I do that?” said Mark L. Booz, Deputy General Counsel at Winston-Salem-based BB&T.

There’s no denying the numbers – there were 1,514 civil jury trials in Virginia in 2000, but only 592 in 2009, according to figures from the National Center for State Courts. That’s a decline of nearly 61 percent.

Litigants are not necessarily trial adverse, however. The number of civil cases heard by judges without juries is on the rise, reported Robert N. Baldwin of the NCSC. “Jury trials are vanishing, but bench trials continue to increase,” Baldwin told the VBA gathering.

Lemons noted the British legal system has abandoned jury trials for the most part. Judges there told him “they are absolutely thrilled not to have to be bothered with them,” he said.

The sentiment may be shared by federal judges in this country. Beck, a leading trial lawyer, said the federal judiciary has adopted a “settlement agenda.” Trials are viewed as a failure of the system, he said.

Another key factor in the decline of jury trials is the expense. With electronic discovery, “costs have exploded exponentially,” Beck said.

Booz, who calls the shots when his bank defends lawsuits, agrees that money is a primary factor limiting the number of trials. His rule of thumb for litigation is that “getting ready for trial is going to be as expensive as what you’ve spent up to that point.”

Besides expense, Booz said the uncertainty of trial and the higher stakes for recent cases mean the bank is often willing to settle.

Despite those factors, Booz said there are some cases he prefers to try. If the other side simply wants too much money, the decision is easy. If there is media attention, bankers might worry that settlement would send the wrong message. The same might be true if there are many similarly situated claimants watching the result.
Booz said some cases he won’t settle on principal. He said he does not willingly pay people who have stolen from the bank or who have made false accusations. He also resists settlement “if the opposing lawyer has been particularly obnoxious.”

“It’s really a seat of the pants, case-by-case determination,” Booz said.

Richmond plaintiff’s lawyer Mark M. Esposito said he sees a sinister trend behind the decline in jury trials. “What we have here is a continuing erosion of fundamental rights by moneyed and political interests [that] aids them greatly in their pursuit of profits and political power,” he said.

Booz disagreed. “I actually think the system is stacked against the corporate interests,” he said, adding that costs of discovery are generally greater for the defense than for the plaintiffs.

Esposito suggested using judge-appointed experts to resolve key issues, replacing the battle of hired guns working for opposing sides.

Lawyers already have tools to limit costs, but rarely use them, one trial judge said. Henrico County Circuit Judge Catherine Hammond said in 12 years on the bench, she has never had a lawyer come into a pretrial conference and propose limiting the number of depositions.

Richmond lawyer Michael W. Smith agreed with Beck that someone should take on the task of promoting the use of juries to resolve civil disputes. “We have lost the support of the public for jury trials,” he said. “We need a spokesperson.”

Whatever the remedy, Beck warned of a social cost if the number of jury trials continues to decline. He said fewer people will be involved in the justice process, and “we stop developing a body of common law that is so essential to developing our system of justice.”

Lemons agreed. “You get disputes resolved outside the courtroom; you get disputes resolved inside the courtroom. But, if you lose the jury trial, the system dies and that’s not good.”









As always, please consult with a Virginia attorney about legal issues raised in this article.  Every situation is unique.

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Monday, July 25, 2011

Caveat emptor lives

Caveat emptor lives

A Virginia Beach circuit judge ordered rescission of a contract to purchase a home after concluding that the seller had painted over mold to divert the buyers from making the inquiries a prudent person ought to make. The judge ordered $83,515 in restitution.

The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed and entered final judgment today for the seller. It was undisputed that a home inspector retained by the buyers found standing water and a mold line in the crawlspace of the home and notified the purchasers of the discovery.

The inspector told the buyers that he couldn’t complete his inspection until the problem with the standing water was remedied and advised them to contact him when that was done. Because they did not “pursue the inquiry diligently to the end,” the doctrine of caveat emptor applied even if there were acts of concealment by the seller, the court held.

The case is Turner v. Bay, Record No. 101239.











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Thursday, July 21, 2011

Beer-can DNA connection to stolen vehicle

Beer-Can DNA Connection to Stolen Vehicle

By Deborah Elkins
Published: July 21, 2011

Tags: , ,

Defendant is not entitled to reversal of his grand larceny conviction for insufficient evidence connecting him to the all-terrain vehicle (ATV) recovered by police, the Court of Appeals says; defendant’s nine prior felony convictions and the record evidence including witness testimony, photographs and DNA on a beer can, proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Defendant, previously convicted of nine felonies, has no driver’s license. He lives in a rural area, staying alternately at the homes of grandmother and girlfriend. On Nov. 30, 2008, a couple who lived about seven miles from the grandmother discovered their green ATV missing. The ATV, purchased four years earlier for $3,500, was in good condition. On Dec,10, 2008, a witness observed a person of defendant’s build standing beside an ATV in the vicinity of his Derby Road home. Another victim living in the same area discovered a can of marine fuel missing from his shed. On December 17, 2008, defendant’s girlfriend told a police investigator she had picked up defendant in the Derby Road area the week before.

She directed him to a wooded area where he found a green ATV about 100 yards from the road and 50 yards from the edge of the woods. The ATV was hot-wired but started with the couple’s key after removing improper marine fuel. This location was about 2.5 miles from the couple’s home and four to five miles from the grandmother’s. A “fanny pack” attached to the handlebars contained a beer can crushed to the shape of a crack pipe with DNA on the lip consistent with defendant’s. One ATV owner died; his widow testified to the model number (350) and photographs corroborated her testimony, contrary to the police investigator who remembered a different model number (349).

On appeal defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to establish that the recovered ATV belonged to victims or that defendant stole the ATV. Applying our deferential standard of review of sufficiency of evidence, we affirm. Circumstantial evidence must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence; the reasonableness of a hypothesis is a finding of fact binding on appeal unless plainly wrong.

Here, the circumstantial evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the recovered ATV was stolen by defendant. Photographs and the widow’s testimony identified the ATV which had been altered after the theft by removal of a gun rack and bucket. Defendant’s girlfriend testified to picking him up in the area the ATV was recovered a week earlier. This location was within a few miles of defendant’s grandmother and the victims. Evaluation of witness credibility is for the finder of fact and statute, Va. Code § 19.2-269 allows consideration of defendant’s nine prior felony convictions. Affirmed.

Dove v. Commonwealth (Annunziata) No. 0785-10-3, July 19, 2011, Pittsylvania Cir. Ct. (Melesco) J. Patterson Rogers, 3rd for appellant; Kathleen B. Martin Sr. AAG. VLW 011-7-245(UP), 6 pp.












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Tuesday, July 19, 2011

'Mutual wills' depend more on trust than law

‘Mutual wills’ depend more on trust than law

By Alan Cooper
Published: July 19, 2011

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Second marriages and “first” children are generating more issues in estate-planning practice, as couples continue to divorce and remarry before they can celebrate that golden anniversary with one spouse.

One of those issues is making sure the children of each spouse get treated equitably when the last parent dies.

Mutual wills, sometimes accompanied by a contract to make a will, attempt to do that. Typically, each spouse leaves his or her estate to the survivor and each child gets an equal share when the surviving spouse dies.

The Supreme Court of Virginia has held that properly drafted mutual wills are enforceable. Black v. Edwards, VLW 094-6-082, and Williams v. Williams, 123 Va. 643 (1918) are the leading cases.

But J. Rodney Johnson, a retired law professor at the University of Richmond says there are no magic words to keep the surviving spouse from writing a new will and leaving everything to his or her children – or to anyone else.

And so many of Johnson’s former clients did just that, he “decided in my private practice that I wasn’t going to do them any more.”

The child who was cut out could go to court in an effort to win enforcement of the provisions of the mutual will and might well prevail, Johnson said.

But establishing that the wills were in fact mutual can be uncertain, daunting and expensive, Johnson said. Even cases with legal merit might not be worth pursuing in the absence of a substantial estate, especially if, as is often the case, assets already have been distributed from the estate.

John Midgett, a trust and estates specialist in Norfolk, agrees with Johnson. “It’s just an invitation to litigation. All you’re doing is throwing it on the heirs to fight it out over what Mommy and Daddy intended.”

Two recent cases, one decided in May by a Hanover County jury, and the other on appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia from Newport News Circuit Court, illustrate the uncertainty in enforcing a mutual will even when the assets are substantial, more than $2 million in the Hanover case and about $1.7 million in the Newport News litigation.

In the Newport News case, Arvid Keith and Lucy Faye Keith each had a child from a previous marriage when they wed in 1972. They signed what the son argued were mutual wills in 1987. The lawyer who drafted the wills said he had no recollection of whether the wills were intended to be mutual.

Arvid died in March 1996, but not before telling his son to “watch out for Faye.” The son interpreted that as a warning to protect his share of what had been a joint estate rather than a request to see that his stepmother was taken care of.

Faye’s signature on a new will two month’s after Arvid’s death suggested the son’s interpretation was correct. The document left everything to Faye’s daughter and named her executor.

After Faye died in 2006, the daughter probated the 1996 will, and the son challenged it.

Judge Timothy S. Fisher ruled the wills themselves didn’t establish that they were intended to be mutual.  There was little other than the uncorroborated testimony of the son about ambiguous statements that his father and stepmother had made to indicate the wills were mutual. The judge upheld the validity of the 1996 will.

The Supreme Court granted the son’s petition for appeal last month, Keith v. Lulofs, Record No. 110433.

The Hanover case differs from the Newport News litigation in that the 1995 mutual will – and a separate contract to make a will – designated the couple’s daughter as the beneficiary. After the mother died in 1997, the daughter moved out of state.

Around 2009, another relative – a distant cousin or great nephew of the mother – helped the father with some health concerns, and he signed the last in a series of revised wills leaving the bulk of estate to the relative and nothing to the daughter.

The daughter did not learn of the new will until the relative attempted to probate it after the father’s death in 2010. She still had a copy of the 1995 contract and will and filed suit arguing the documents required the estate to go to her.

A jury overturned the will after the presiding judge ruled the daughter’s remedy would be specific performance if she prevailed. Final resolution of the case, McDougle v. Bruggeman, is still pending in the trial court.

Johnson and Midgett said there is a way to avoid the problem created when spouses have agreed on who should inherit their estate and the survivor changes his or her mind after the death of the first spouse.

It involves setting up an irrevocable trust with an independent trustee to hold and distribute the assets, Johnson said.

But many clients are uncomfortable with such a legalistic concept, he said.

Trusting a spouse to do the right thing, even when warned that it may well be a matter of trust, not law, still may be preferable to the client, he said.











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Tuesday, July 12, 2011

‘Lifestyle’ Comment Not Grounds for Reversal

‘Lifestyle’ Comment Not Grounds for Reversal

By Deborah Elkins
Published: July 6, 2011

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The Court of Appeals affirmed a final divorce decree determining spousal support and requiring husband to pay wife’s expert regarding husband’s ability to work; the trial court’s determinations are supported by the record and its decision to award expert expenses was not an abuse of discretion.

Husband and wife separated after 19 years of marriage and two children now adults. Husband voluntarily retired at age 55 from a job at World Bank that paid him $250,000 annually. Wife age 47 has not worked outside the home; she maintained the household while husband traveled and provided care for the children, one chronically ill.

At a hearing on contested matters, wife presented expert testimony about husband’s high earning capacity and worksheets supporting her monthly expenses of $6,491. Husband stipulated gross income between $245,000 and $250,000. Wife’s cost to retain her expert was $5,800. The final decree imputed to husband annual income of $250,000, awarded wife $7,182 monthly support and ordered husband to pay wife’s expert expenses. The trial court observed that the parties lived an “incredibly well or good lifestyle spending hundreds of thousands of dollars.”

Husband appeals each of the trial court determinations and its observation about the parties’ lifestyle. We affirm, applying our deferential standard of review for fact findings. Wife’s expert, a letter from husband’s former employer and his own stipulation all support imputed income of $250,000. Wife presented evidence of her expenses and the decree states that the trial court considered all the statutory factors in determining support. Under Groves v. Commonwealth, 50 Va. App. 57 (2007), we do not focus on isolated statements of the trial judge; the record does not make clear that the trial court’s observation about the parties’ lifestyle affected the spousal support award. Ordering husband to pay wife’s expert expenses was within the discretion of the trial judge. Affirmed.

Armar v. Armar
(Powell) No. 2202-10-4, June 28, 2011, Arlington Cir. Ct. (Kendrick) Alan B. Soschin for appellant. VLW 011-7-220(UP), 6 pp.











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Monday, July 11, 2011

Ghostwriters in the courts

Ghostwriters in the courts

July 8th, 2011 · No Comments · Uncategorized

Ghostwriting lawyers, beware, warns another federal judge in an opinion released last month.

Alexandria Senior U.S. District Judge James C. Cacheris became suspicious when he compared Wilfredo Sejas’ pro se complaint to a similar challenge to a foreclosure Sejas filed against the same mortgage company in Prince William Circuit Court in 2009. And the plaintiff’s motion for a continuance in the federal case was signed “Wyman P. Rodriguez, pro se.” The telephone number provided on the pleadings did not belong to Sejas, the judge said.

The earlier complaint, drafted by counsel, said Sejas could not speak, read, or write English. Remarkably, the judge said, the new federal complaint was written in English. Either the plaintiff’s language skills improved dramatically in two years, or the pleadings were ghost-written, Cacheris said in Sejas v. MortgageIT Inc.

Cacheris cited two other Eastern District cases to remind lawyers that ghostwriting pleadings for pro se litigants violates court rules.

If you’re working behind the scenes to draft complaints for pro se plaintiffs, you’re violating ethics rules as well, the judge admonished before he dismissed the complaint on res judicata grounds.

By Deborah Elkins











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Thursday, July 07, 2011

Bedbug bites back fraud and consumer claims

Bedbug bites back fraud and consumer claims

By Paul Fletcher
Published: July 7, 2011

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A Northern Virginia family moved into an apartment in Fairfax in 2009 that they claim was so infested with bedbugs that they had to move out just a few months later.

They just learned that they can sue their landlord for the bites they suffered and other injuries.

In addition to a breach of contract lawsuit based on their lease, they can pursue a fraud claim and a count under the Virginia Consumer Protection Act, a Fairfax judge has ruled.

However, in Park v. Gates Hudson Inc. (VLW 011-8-122), Fairfax Circuit Judge R. Terrence Ney rebuffed the family’s effort to use a new Supreme Court case to bring a negligence claim or a gross negligence claim that might carry punitive damages.

Immediate problems
The family – a man, a woman and their two children – moved into the apartment in early 2009, and they say they discovered bedbug infestation so severe that they moved out that May.

They brought suit earlier this year under a number of claims – breach of contract, negligence, gross negligence, fraud and the Virginia Consumer Protection Act.

The contract was straightforward – it was based on breach of the lease. The landlord promised to provide an apartment that was in “good and satisfactory condition and repair.” It allegedly provided an apartment that was not clean, safe, sanitary or free of vermin. That was enough to keep the claim in court, Ney wrote, overruling a demurrer.

The judge tossed the negligence counts, however. The plaintiffs sought to use a [January] decision from the Supreme Court of Virginia, Kaltman v. All American Pest Control (VLW 011-6-037). The decision held that in some circumstances a claim for negligence can stand independently from a breach of a contract.

In that case, the judge wrote, homeowners hired a pest control company that used the wrong pesticide, in breach of their agreement. There was a separate statutory duty that the defendant breached. There was no comparable statutory duty in this case, Ney said, dismissing those claims.

Although the fraud claim was “perhaps imperfectly alleged,” Ney let it go forward. The plaintiffs claimed that the landlord knew about the bedbug problems and made misrepresentations about the condition of the apartment before they signed the lease.

The judge allowed a Virginia Consumer Protection Act claim on similar grounds. The Act covers leases and “the alleged concealment of bedbug infestation constitutes a deceptive trade practice” under the Act, he wrote.

The plaintiffs were not able to keep a claim for intentional infliction for emotional distress.
Under the case law, that cause of action requires a defendant to have engaged in conduct that is offensive and intolerable.

Dismissing that count, Ney concluded, “Bedbugs may be a genuine problem, but they hardly offend decency and morality.”











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    Wednesday, July 06, 2011

    Sex-offender mom challenges ban on school visits

    Sex-offender mom challenges ban on school visits

    By Deborah Elkins
    Published: July 1, 2011

    Tags: ,

    A Spotsylvania County mother says being banned from schools and daycare centers because of a 1993 sex offense violates her constitutional right to rear her children.

    But a Richmond federal court has dismissed her lawsuit challenging a Virginia statutory scheme that forced her to “out” herself as a sex offender in order to get permission to be on school property.

    “Jane Doe” was convicted in 1993 of carnal knowledge of a minor without the use of force, and was required to register in Virginia as a sex offender under Va. Code § 9.1-902. A former teacher, Doe alleged in her federal lawsuit that she had a consensual affair with a student. Under a 2008 statutory amendment, her offense was reclassified as a “sexually violent offense” because she was five years older than the victim.

    Personal information that identifies registered offenders is available in the online registry, but the plaintiff sued under a pseudonym to challenge statutory restrictions that keep her from enjoying the kind of daily routine available to most parents of young children.

    As the parent of three children, one school-aged and two nearly ready, Doe said she cannot attend parent-teacher conferences, take her kids to school if they miss the bus or have a doctor’s appointment, take her son to Cub Scouts, enroll her children in after-school programs or have them vaccinated at a program offered through school.

    She also claimed the statutory restrictions interfered with her free exercise of religion because area churches she might want to attend have daycare or Sunday school programs subject to the restriction.

    Virginia’s statutory scheme allows for relaxation of restrictions on a registered offender’s presence at a school or daycare center through a petition to the circuit court. The statute also requires notice to the commonwealth’s attorney and notice to and permission from the particular school administrator or daycare proprietor.

    Doe did not pursue the petition-and-permission procedures because she said it would force her to affirmatively disclose her identity and status and would brand her three small children as the offspring of a sex offender.

    Instead, she sued the Spotsylvania County school board and the Virginia state police, saying she was entitled to file an anonymous petition.

    The federal court had no jurisdiction over Doe’s claims because the defendant school board could not take any action until a circuit court acted on a petition for entry onto school grounds, said Richmond U.S. District Judge John A. Gibney. If the court denied the petition, it didn’t matter what the school board would do, he said. Nor had Doe approached the board or any churches to request permission to enter their property.
    She doesn’t know whether those institutions would require her to disclose her identity, or to whom disclosure would have to be made, the court said in Doe v. Va. Dep’t of State Police. (VLW 011-3-350).

    As to her complaint that the school board should allow an anonymous procedure, the court said this was “nonsense. The Board must know the identity of the applicant in order to make informed decisions concerning entrants on school property and to ensure the safety of schoolchildren.”

    Doe still had many ways to participate in her children’s education, the court said, through phone calls and off-site meetings with teachers and administrators. Her inability to go on school property was no different that that of “an incarcerated parent, or a rural parent who has lost her driver’s license,” Gibney said.











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    Tuesday, July 05, 2011

    25 cases that changed law practice in Virginia

    25 Cases That Changed Law Practice in Virginia
    We look back at the cases that created a buzz during our first quarter-century of publication.

    By Deborah Elkins
    Published: July 4, 2011

    Tags: ,

    Twenty-five years, one quarter of a century, one score and five years. In other words, a heck of a long time.

    That’s how long Virginia Lawyers Weekly has tracked, analyzed and summarized cases from Virginia state and federal courts.

    The ways we gather and present court cases have evolved, but our mission has remained the same: to present accurate and timely accounts of current decisions, so the legal community of Virginia can stay abreast of developing case law. We read lots of opinions, so lawyers don’t have to. They can focus on their clients’ matters, confident they have a tool to help them stay up to date on the cases most important to their own work.

    We cover the court decisions vital to lawyers’ practices. These are the cases that prompt a lawyer to take action: make a note to a file, revise a pleading, or call a client or colleague.

    Along with our semi-annual compilation of Important Opinions during this our 25th Anniversary year, we are highlighting 25 cases (give or take a few) that have changed law practice in Virginia.

    The cases we highlight in our look back may not necessarily represent the current state of the law in Virginia. Rather, they reflect the cases that generated a buzz at the time they were handed down, and in the days and months that followed.

    Over the years, we’ve worked constantly to respond to reader interest, offered in calls, comments and conversations with lawyers and judges as we continue to cover the legal community in the commonwealth. Let us know if you’d like to add to, or subtract from, our list of 25 big cases.

    BUSINESS LAW

    Dirt law & attorney’s fees
    Frank v. Tipco Homes Inc. (1990). The little case that roared. A Virginia trial court says a buyer could void a contract with a builder because the agreement did not satisfy Va. Code § 11-2.3, which required completed performance within two years. Lawyers say it’s a “startling result” and “rush” to amend their form contracts. Trial courts around the commonwealth follow Tipco before the legislature repeals the statute.


    Mullins v. Richlands Nat’l Bank (1991). For lawyers who want attorney’s fees, expert testimony “ordinarily” will be required to determine a “reasonable” fee, the Supreme Court of Virginia says. Lawyers tell us it’s a “radical change” in the way they do business.


    Tullidge v. Board of Supervisors of Augusta County (1990). In a fight over relocation of a county seat, the Supreme Court takes its first look at Virginia’s sanctions statute, Va. Code § 8.01-271.1, and says questions of “reasonableness” must favor the litigant. After a series of high court cases with no sanctions, some lawyers and judges complain the Virginia statute has no teeth.

    CRIMINAL LAW

    DNA, harmless error, showing up for court

    Spencer v. Commonwealth (1989). In this prosecution of the “Southside strangler,” the Supreme Court of Virginia upholds the reliability of “so-called” DNA fingerprinting. We report it’s the first decision by any state high court reviewing the admissibility of this “revolutionary test procedure,” and that prosecutors expect to continue exercising “extreme caution” in their use of this “expensive, highly complex procedure.”


    Stevenson v. City of Falls Church (1992). A drunken driver found sitting behind the wheel of his car with his keys in the ignition, but the engine turned off, was not “operating” a motor vehicle, the Virginia Supreme Court says. Traffic court lawyers are still trying different arguments to take advantage of this loophole.


    Singleton v. Commonwealth (2009). In a case “closely watched” by lawyers and courts managing busy dockets, the Virginia high court vacates criminal contempt convictions for two Tidewater lawyers who got a prosecutor’s agreement to a continuance, but neglected to tell the court. Better to get a court order before a no-show, the justices say.

    EMPLOYMENT LAW

    Wrongful discharge, ‘actual risk’ and noncompetes

    Thompson v. Kings Entertainment Co. (1987). A Richmond U.S. District Court says an employee could sue for wrongful discharge based on a standard for termination in an employee handbook. Management lawyers work hard to get the word out to employers: Check your handbook, add disclaimers and make sure your employee signs off on the terms of employment in the handbook.


    Hill City Trucking Co. v. Christian (1989). The Supreme Court of Virginia zigzags seven times in a case that initially rejected a workers’ comp award to a trucker who was robbed and shot while on duty. Lawyers debate the court’s views on “actual risk” and “positional risk.” After a rehearing and do-over of the whole briefing and argument process, the high court rejects positional risk, reverses the award of benefits and dismisses the case.


    Lockhart v. Comm. Educ. Systems (1994). In a 4-3 split, the Supreme Court of Virginia says at-will employees can sue for wrongful discharge in state court, based on gender or race discrimination, and state-court employment practice booms in Virginia.


    Doss v. Jamco (1997). Lawyers who represented employees had fun while it lasted, but the General Assembly passed “Lockhart” amendments to the Virginia Human Rights Act, and in Doss, the Supreme Court severely curtails a Virginia common-law wrongful discharge claim for discrimination based on public policies in the VHRA. Plaintiff lawyers turn to other arguments to chip away at the public-policy exception to at-will employment.


    James Ltd. v. Saks Fifth Avenue Inc. (2005). Drafting and litigating noncompete agreements continues to generate business for lawyers. In this circuit court case, a high-end retailer in Tysons Galleria wins a $1.6 million jury award on a noncompete that kept a retail competitor’s top salesman from working within one mile of the competitor for three years after he left the store.


    Raytheon Technical Services Co. v. Hyland (2007) (2009). A pair of Supreme Court opinions in an executive’s defamation suit against her former employer prompts HR managers to scrutinize personnel evaluations to sort the “opinions” from the factual statements that an employer may need to prove before a jury.

    FAMILY LAW

    Support payments, attorney’s fees & cohabitation
    Srinivasan v. Srinivasan (1990). The Virginia Court of Appeals says a spousal support award can take into account what the payee spouse should be earning, with “reasonable time” to find work. Lawyers start using vocational experts to litigate “imputed income.”


    Lee v. Lee (1990). The Virginia Court of Appeals puts the fear in lawyers with its pronouncement that signing off on orders with the boilerplate “Seen and Objected To” does not cut it under the contemporaneous objection rule. In a rehearing, the appellate court gives more guidance on how to give the trial judge a fair shot at correcting an error before you take it up.


    Antonelli v. Antonelli (1991). A dad whose income dropped after a voluntary job change can’t reduce his child support; the Supreme Court of Virginia says he “gambled with his children’s ability to receive his financial support, and lost.”


    Wilson v. Wilson (1997). Domestic relations lawyers wanted attorney’s fees for appeals, but weren’t sure how to get them. Lawyers respond to Wilson’s practice tip – ask for fees in the opening brief and prove your fees on remand in the trial court – and tell us more fees are being awarded to discourage frivolous appeals.

    Sullivan v. Jones (2004). One of the “mom’s move” cases decided by the Court of Appeals, this case upholding an out-of-state move 11 months after it happened encouraged parents to move first and ask permission later, some lawyers said.

    PERSONAL INJURY

    When are landlords liable?

    Deem v. Charles E. Smith Mgmt. (1986) The 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals says that under Virginia common law, landlords have no duty to protect a tenant from criminal acts by a third party. Plaintiff’s lawyers head to state court to challenge that view of the law and continue to test the parameters of a possible duty.

    Klingbeil Mgmt. Group Co. v. Vito (1987). The Supreme Court of Virginia holds the line for landlords, saying a landlord was not liable to a tenant who was sexually assaulted and that state law preempts a local ordinance that required deadbolt locks.


    Taboada v. Daly Seven Inc. (2006). After rehearing, the Virginia high court upholds a decision in favor of a Roanoke motel guest shot in the parking lot. Lawyers say the case will make it easier for a guest attacked by a third party to sue an innkeeper.


    Med-mal cap tested
    Boyd v. Bulala (1986) and Etheridge v. Medical Center Hospitals (1989). In Boyd, a Charlottesville federal judge strikes Virginia’s statutory cap on medical malpractice damages as a violation of the Seventh Amendment jury trial right, but the Supreme Court of Virginia upholds the cap in Etheridge, and lawyers say settlement negotiations speed up but offers are discounted.


    Punitives for drunken driving
    Booth v. Robertson (1988). This case may have set a high standard for a punitives claim in a p.i. case against a drunken driver – the defendant driver had a 0.22 blood alcohol content and was driving the wrong way down a ramp on a dark, rainy night after ignoring another motorist’s warning – but it encourages p.i. lawyers to go for punitives, as demonstrated by wins in local Virginia trial courts.

    Accident reports & doctor “write-offs”
    Overton v. Dise (1995). This trial court decision that says an auto-accident defendant has to give the plaintiff access to an insurance carrier’s claim investigation file, with defendant’s day-after statement to the claims adjuster. Over the next few years, lawyers track circuit court rulings in accident report cases all over Virginia. To help them out, VLW debuted its “Virginia Lawyers Weekly On-line” service in 1996. This service is now known as, of course, valawyersweekly.com. Our Boston-based “vice-president of technology” says “if an attorney has been waiting for a reason to join the Internet, it’s here.”


    State Farm v. Bowers (1998) and Acuar v. Letourneau (2000). Lower-court contests over a plaintiff’s right to recover medical expenses that were “written off” by a healthcare provider set the stage for Bowers, the high court holding that a plaintiff couldn’t get med pay for more than the amount a doctor accepted from a health insurance plan. But in Acuar, the Supreme Court says a p.i. plaintiff could try to prove his damages by using the full amount of the doctor’s bills.

    Nonsuits, UM for ‘users’ outside a vehicle, distress
    Dodson v. Potomac Mack Sales (1991). This Supreme Court of Virginia case sends “shock waves” through the legal community, when the court says a plaintiff who voluntarily nonsuited a wrongful death action does not get the extra six months under the nonsuit statute to refile the case. Later that year, the General Assembly amended the controlling statutes to provide a six-month tolling provision.

    Great American Ins. Co. v. Cassell (1989). A firefighter’s estate wins uninsured motorist coverage after he was killed by a hit-and-run driver while standing 25 feet away from his parked fire truck, “using” the truck. The decision prompts a series of cases that looked at variations on the “use” theme.


    Russo v. White (1991). No look back at p.i. cases would be complete without a mention of this Virginia Supreme Court case that turned away a claim for emotional distress based on telephone harassment. It’s probably cited somewhere in a Virginia court at least once a week.


    Alcoy v. Valley Nursing Homes Inc. (2006). Nursing-home litigation continues to be a growth industry, and the Supreme Court says a nursing-home patient’s suit alleging sexual assault is more like a premises liability claim than a med-mal action, and damages aren’t limited by the med-mal cap.











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