Thursday, April 28, 2011

Condo Association Not Liable for Shower Leak

Condo Association Not Liable for Shower Leak

By Deborah Elkins
Published: April 25, 2011

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A condo owner cannot recover from the unit owners’ association for damages from a shower leak in her unit, as the bylaws specifically limit the association’s liability for this kind of water damage; an Alexandria Circuit Court grants summary judgment to the association.

For purposes of interpreting the contract between the parties arising out of plaintiff’s purchase of a condominium unit in Carlyle Towers, the material facts are not in dispute. The Declaration and Bylaws of the Unit Owners Association govern the duties and responsibilities of the unit owners and the association regarding damages to the individual units and to the common elements.

The Declaration states in section 2.4 that repair and maintenance responsibilities are governed by the Bylaws. The Bylaws state in section 3.11(b) that the association shall not be liable for injury or damage to person or property resulting from electricity, water, snow or ice which may leak or flow from any pipe, drain, conduit, appliance or equipment.

There is no factual dispute that the damage to plaintiff’s unit was caused by water leaking from the shower within plaintiff’s unit. Regardless of the source of the leak and regardless of whether or not plaintiff was negligent, this claim falls within the limitation of liability stated above. It was water leaking from a pipe, drain or conduit that caused plaintiff’s damage. A similar limitation on liability was upheld in iiiNido v. Ocean Owners’ Council,iii 237 Va. 664 (1989).

Plaintiff argues that section 5.5 of the Bylaws and the chart of responsibilities within that section set for the basis to determine the association’s responsibilities and that chart states that it is the association’s responsibility for “Water damage to common elements or units other than the one which is the primary source of the problem through negligence of the occupants of such unit. Plaintiff argues that the issue of negligence is factually in dispute and summary judgment is inappropriate.

This section is not inconsistent with section 3.11(b), which specifically excludes specific causes for water damage for which the association will not be liable. Since the cause of plaintiff’s damage comes within the specific exception contained in section 3.11(b), that section and not section 5.5 govern the responsibilities in this case.

As a matter of law, defendant has specifically limited its liability to plaintiff and cannot be held liable.

Kuhn v. Carlyle Towers Condominium Unit Owners Ass’n (Swersky) No. CL 10002975, April 8, 2011; Alexandria Cir.Ct.; Thomas A. Hill for plaintiff; Andrew J. Terrell for defendant. VLW 011-8-073, 2 pp.












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Tuesday, April 26, 2011

Brain-Scan Suit Still Timely Under 'Continuing Treatment' Rule

Charlottesville Personal Injury Lawyer

Brain-Scan Suit Timely Under ‘Continuing Treatment’ Rule

By Deborah Elkins
Published: April 25, 2011

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The Supreme Court of Virginia applies the “continuing treatment” rule and says a woman who had seven brain scans performed and interpreted by defendant radiology practice group from 2002 through 2005 for pain and numbness in the right side of her face can sue the group in 2007 for medical malpractice; the Supreme Court of Virginia reverses dismissal of the suit as time-barred.

Med-mal actions are governed by the two-year statute of limitations for personal injuries, in Va. Code § 8.01-243(A). Code § 8.01-230 provides that the right of action shall be deemed to accrue and the prescribed limitation period shall begin to run from the date the injury is sustained in the case of injury to the person. Thus, it is well established that the statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff is injured, not when the plaintiff discovers the injury. The continuing treatment rule operates as an exception. Under that rule, the statute begins to run at the conclusion of the course of treatment for a particular disease or condition.

The dispositive issue in this case is whether a “continuous and substantially uninterrupted course of examination and treatment” existed between Chalifoux and Radiology Associates (RA), or whether RA’s treatment of Chalifoux was a series of single, isolated acts. Plaintiff Chalifoux maintains that the sheer fact she repeatedly returned to RA for brain studies with the same or similar symptoms is indicative of a continuing course of examination and diagnosis. She maintains her suit filed Oct. 12, 2007 was within the two-year statute of limitations.

RA contends the last arguable date for Chalifoux’s medical malpractice action to accrue was Feb.16, 2004, the date of the last brain MRI which she claims was negligently reported and interpreted.

While we have not previously considered whether the continuing treatment rule applies to radiologists, other jurisdictions have addressed the issue. The facts in this case are similar to those in iiiMontgomery v. South County Radiologists,iii 49 S.W. 3d 191 (Mo. 2001).

Between December 2002 and October 2005, plaintiff’s treating physicians referred her to RA on six occasions for diagnostic radiology studies. During that time, RA studied and interpreted seven scans of plaintiff’s brain and head. Each study related to the same or similar symptoms: the pain and numbness on the right side of plaintiff’s face. There is evidence that RA was aware of plaintiff’s ongoing symptoms because all the studies were kept in one file under plaintiff’s name, and both experts in this case testified that radiologists frequently review previous examinations, especially when they relate to the same symptoms.

Under these facts, we find a “continuous and substantially uninterrupted course of examination and treatment” existed between plaintiff and RA. We hold the circuit court erred in not applying the continuing treatment rule to the facts of this case. The statute of limitations began to run on Oct. 24, 2005, the day the physician-patient relationship between RA and Chalifoux ended. Her suit brought on Oct. 12, 2007, was within the applicable two-year statute of limitations.

The circuit court erred 062, in sustaining RA’s plea of the statute of limitations. We will reverse the judgment and remand the case.

Reversed and remanded.

Dissent

Russell, S.J., joined by Goodwyn, J.: Undoubtedly, radiologists frequently act as treating physicians, but there is no evidence that they ever did so in the present case. The circuit court made no finding of fact from the evidence that the radiologists did not assume a duty of providing treatment to plaintiff. Rather, the court found the radiologists assumed a duty to adhere to “appropriate diagnostic procedures.” We are bound by that finding.

The evidence, in my view, fully supports the circuit court finding that the radiologists’ relationship with the plaintiff was episodic, not continuing care, and that they were not her treating physicians to whom the continuing treatment rule would apply.

Because I consider the majority opinion to be an extension of the continuing treatment exception unwarranted by these facts, I respectfully dissent.

Chalifoux v. Radiology Associates of Richmond Inc. (Koontz) No. 100052, April 21, 2011; Richmond Cir.Ct. (Jenkins) Philip S. Marstiller Jr. for appellant; Brewster S. Rawls, Sandra M. Holleran for appellee. VLW 011-6-062, 20 pp.











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Monday, April 25, 2011

Overdraft Protection & Payment No Defense to Check Charge

Overdraft Protection & Payment No Defense to Check Charge

By Deborah Elkins
Published: April 21, 2011

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Defendant is not entitled to have her bench trial convictions for felony check uttering reversed based on her testimony about participating in an overdraft protection program and delayed notice of dishonor due to her eviction, the Court of Appeals said.

After being evicted from her apartment, defendant cashed two checks totaling $425 at a store over a two day period. The checks were drawn on a federal credit union that denied payment twice, one week and two weeks later, the second time because defendant’s account was closed. Defendant testified she met with a credit union branch manager to review her account before it was closed and the two checks did not come up. The store sent defendant a certified letter demanding payment in five days. The post office returned the letter as undeliverable with the notation “unable to forward.” One year later a police officer informed defendant of an outstanding arrest warrant and two months later, defendant paid the store for the checks and associated fees.

On appeal defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to prove intent to defraud. We affirm. The appellate standard of review asks if any rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Virginia’s Bad Check Statute, Va. Code § 18.2-181, aims to discourage writing bad checks and Va. Code § 18.2-183 establishes a rebuttable presumption requiring prompt payment within five days of notice to avoid it. The trial court was not required to credit defendant’s testimony about the overdraft protection program. Defendant acknowledged prior felony convictions. She admitted being unsure of her balance when the checks were written and was unable to attest to knowing about the two checks when she met with the credit union manager. She admitted being evicted for financial difficulties shortly before writing the checks and her failure to inform the store of her address change indicates an intent to make herself more difficult to locate.

Charles v. Commonwealth (Beales), Docket No. 1054-10-2, April 19, 2011, Chesterfield Circuit Court (Burgess), Todd M. Ritter for appellant, John W. Blanton, AAG.VLW 011-7-137(UP), 9 pp.










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Friday, April 22, 2011

Victim of False Accusation Can Sue Police Officer

A contractor who was locked up and falsely portrayed as potential child molester gets to try his defamation case against the police officer who had him arrested.

Michael Lewis was working in a Prince George County neighborhood when a 10-year-old boy asked if Lewis could give him a ride home. When Lewis agreed, the boy got into Lewis’ truck.

Before Lewis could leave, a resident approached and yelled for the boy to get out of the truck and said he was calling 911. Lewis explained the circumstances and drove away, but the resident reported the incident to police.

The officer who responded never interviewed anyone before issuing an arrest warrant and publicizing the purported kidnap attempt, according to Lewis’ complaint. Lewis spent 41 days in jail before a prosecutor spoke with the young “victim,” verified Lewis’ account of the incident, and dropped the charges.

Lewis’ lawsuit against the officer was tossed out of court, but the Supreme Court of Virginia Thursday reinstated Lewis’ defamation claim, although it upheld dismissal of claims for malicious prosecution and false imprisonment.










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Monday, April 18, 2011

Richmond Realtor Pleads Guilty to Mortgage Loan Scheme

Realtor pleads guilty to mortgage loan scheme

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Richmond-area Realtor Jodi D. Robinson would take a piece of property she owned, find an unqualified buyer, doctor the loan application for that person, sell it at a higher price, pay off the first mortgage and pocket the rest, according to court documents.

The scheme caught up with her.

Robinson, 38, pleaded guilty Wednesday in U.S. District Court to a multiyear, four-part scheme involving $2.4 million worth of mortgage loans in 16 real estate transactions.

Robinson admitted to obtaining loans that defrauded Washington Mutual Bank; SunTrust Bank; the Federal National Mortgage Association, known as Fannie Mae; the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp., known as Freddie Mac; and the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development's Section 8 voucher program for needy people, according to court records.

Total loan losses were estimated at $1.2 million, records show. Total losses to HUD were about $105,000.

Robinson, who owned Citicorp Investments LLC real estate firm, faces up to 30 years in prison and $1 million in fines. She will be sentenced July 13.

U.S. Magistrate Judge M. Hannah Lauck said at Wednesday's hearing that Robinson must relinquish her real estate license.

The scheme involved four overlapping parts.

In some transactions, where Robinson was simply the real estate agent, she and her accomplices would misrepresent a borrower's employment status and overstate monthly employment income, so the person would qualify for a loan, court records show.

The second part of the scheme involved transactions in which Robinson was not only the agent but also was buying and selling properties she rented. She secretly used people who wouldn't qualify for mortgage loans to buy the properties.

The mortgage loan applications were fraudulent on several levels, according to court records.

The applications did not disclose Robinson as having any interest in the deal. Also, financial information was falsified to enhance the buyers' creditworthiness, court records show.

Another part of the scheme involved HUD's rental voucher program for needy people.

Robinson applied to HUD so that properties she controlled could qualify for HUD's subsidized rental program. She falsely represented that she was the owner of the properties, records show. HUD rental subsidies were sent to Robinson, who used the money to make monthly mortgage payments.

To make more money on rental properties, Robinson would "sell" properties at higher prices to the unqualified buyers who would fraudulently obtain higher mortgage loans, according to the criminal report.

Some "buyers" supposedly worked at Prestige Limousine Service in Henrico County, court documents show. Prestige was owned by Robinson's father but controlled by her.

Robinson prepared documents showing one particular "borrower" supposedly earned $4,765 a month as a limousine driver, so the person could quality to buy a $159,000 house in 2006. The person actually had total income of $7,800 that year, according to court records.

Robinson would obtain access to the proceeds of the new loan, records show.

The case was investigated by HUD's Office of the Inspector General, the U.S. Postal Inspection Service and the FBI, Richmond Division. Assistant U.S. Attorney David T. Maguire is prosecuting the case.










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Tuesday, April 12, 2011

4th Circuit calls a penalty on the Redskins

Article from VLW:

4th Circuit calls a penalty on Redskins

March 31st, 2011 · No Comments · Discrimination

As March Madness peaks, consider the fall football season.

On any given Sunday, most fans at an NFL stadium may take for granted the rockin’ atmosphere. For some fans, something was missing from the multi-sensory assault of a live game. Which stadium anthem is booming over the loudspeaker? We are the champions? Who let the dogs out? We will rock you?

After hearing-impaired fans filed an ADA suit against the Washington Redskins, the organization captioned most of the aural content – game play and other announcements – the plaintiffs wanted to access.

Nevertheless, a federal court in Maryland said the plaintiffs had a disability discrimination claim because the fans did not have access to the lyrics of music played over the stadium’s PA system. Earlier this month, the 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals agreed.

“Whatever the poetic merit of the lyrics and their relevance to the sport of football, we agree with the district court that the music played over the public address system during Redskins home games is part of the football game experience that defendants provide as a good or service, and that the ADA requires full and equal access to the music lyrics,” the court said in its March 25 unpublished per curiam opinion in Feldman v. Pro Football Inc.

For the record, the 4th Circuit noted that the Redskins’ “Half-Time Mix” includes the immortal lyrics from Lil’ Mama’s “Shawty Get Loose”: “Y’all don’t really want it but the young got time/ With a flow so spec like … technologic/ Shawty get loose, baby do what you do, let me see you let down your hair.”

The lyrics may be “nonsensical,” said the panel but (ahem) without “access to the lyrics played … during cheerleader dance routines and the halftime show, plaintiffs would not fully and equally experience the planned and synchronized promotional entertainment that large stadiums like FedEx Field provide.”

A dissent by Chief Judge James A. Beaty, of the Middle District of North Carolina, complained that the majority’s “equal access to aural content” standard could require that all content broadcast over a public stadium’s PA system be captured and broadcast to hearing-impaired patrons.

According to their website, the Redskins now offer to send patrons emails with the lyrics to the songs to which the Redskins cheerleaders perform during games.

By Deborah Elkins









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Monday, April 11, 2011

For Love or for Money? Golf coach was ‘volunteer’ not entitled to overtime!

For love or for money?
Golf coach was ‘volunteer’ not entitled to overtime

By Peter Vieth
Published: April 11, 2011
Tags: , , ,

James Purdham is a safety and security officer at Hayfield Secondary School in Fairfax County.

For 15 years, he also has served as the golf coach at the school. He handles daily practices; he transports players to and from the golf course, and sometimes, back home if a parent is running late.

His squad has 12 to 16 players. He started a “B” squad so he wouldn’t have to cut anyone.

Purdham got paid an annual stipend of $2,000 for his work.

The pay doesn’t begin to compensate for all that time and effort. But high school coaches, many of whom are paid stipends like Purdham, spend thousands of hours on their teams because they love kids, they love sports and they embrace the opportunity to teach and influence young people.

However, when the mortgage comes due or the coach has to feed his own family, that dedication and passion for helping kids conflicts with the coach’s own personal needs.

Whether to pay more than a stipend for coaching work is a dilemma that has vexed school boards across the country. Local governments and schools face budget cutbacks and a tight economy just as private businesses do.

Employees who want to get paid for extra work have been filing overtime-pay claims against both public and private employers.

In a new case involving a Fairfax high school golf coach, a federal appeals court has closed the door on the effort to get overtime pay for hourly-pay school employees who coach student athletic teams.

It’s a legal decision in a lawsuit brought by Purdham that addresses the tension between duty to others and duty to self, between volunteer work and compensated work, between love and money.

The central legal issue is whether the coaches are working as employees deserving pay or as volunteers. And on that issue, Purdham lost, in part because his own dedication and concern were used to define him as a big-hearted volunteer.

For three years, Purdham and other Fairfax County hourly-paid school coaches received overtime pay for their coaching work. The county’s short-lived largess stemmed from “an abundance of caution” in light of litigation against other school districts based on the requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Purdham and other coaches received retroactive overtime payments for their coaching from 2003 to 2005. Along with those payments came announcement of a new policy – no more coaching for hourly (or “non-exempt”) employees like Purdham.

Before that policy could go into effect, the Department of Labor issued a guidance opinion letter on the issue of overtime for school coaches. Based on that letter, the Fairfax school system decided its full-time hourly employees could be safely considered as “volunteers” when they coached student athletic teams. The new policy was rescinded, and Purdham and other non-exempt coaches were back on stipends.

Purdham sued the school board under the FLSA. His efforts to make the suit a class action were rebuffed.

While considering the case, U.S. District Judge Liam O’Grady read declarations, or statements, from 18 other Fairfax County coaches, all of whom considered themselves volunteers, at least in part.

One of the declarations is illustrative: T.J. Dade, a retired Washington police officer who now works as a security guard at a Fairfax County high school, also served as the girls’ basketball team coach.

During the four-month basketball season, he said he dedicated at least 40 hours a week – the equivalent of another full-time job – to the team.

He drove the team to practices and games and bought the team trophies. When the team stopped at a McDonald’s on the way home late from a game, he was the one who paid for the quarter pounder and fries if one of the players had no money.

For all his time and all those out-of-pocket expenses, he earned a stipend of $3,532.

But he acknowledged, “Frankly, I would volunteer my time as a head coach without the stipend. … You don’t do this for the money.”

An alliance of school board organizations filed an amicus brief, saying school districts would be forced to shut down programs if they had to pay coaches as employees. “[M]any school districts cannot afford to pay coaches regular wages, much less overtime pay,” said Anne Bryant, executive director of the National School Boards Association.

Some coaches, however, said they do have money in mind when they take on after-work duties, including coaching. In his deposition, Purdham said he coached “in part for the money.” A Fairfax school instructional assistant stated in an affidavit he coached three sports during the year and received about $11,000 in coaching income.

Another golf coach took issue with attempts to describe his job as a “voluntary position.” In a deposition, Chris Tippins said, “the word ‘voluntary,’ it just didn’t make a lot of sense, because I mean to me I feel like I applied for the job. I interviewed for the job. To me it’s a job.”

But that point of view lost out. O’Grady looked to FLSA case law and determined that the Fairfax golf coaches were “volunteers,” not “employees.”

The 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals took a similar view in Purdham v. Fairfax County School Board (VLW 009-3-668), in a unanimous panel opinion by Judge Andre M. Davis.

“[T]his case presents a classic example of an individual who is motivated, in significant part, by humanitarian and charitable instincts,” Davis wrote.

Purdham’s own dedication as a coach seemed to undermine his efforts to paint the job as an economic choice.

“Purdham is motivated by his long-standing love of golf and his dedication to his student athletes. He prefers coaching over obtaining a part-time job because it is a ‘lifestyle choice’ to coach; coaching young golfers provides him with ‘satisfaction,’” Davis said.

Purdham said he was available to his players around the clock, receiving text messages at the dinner table and driving players home when their parents were late or unable to pick them up. He also described work he did during the off-season, “answering e-mails, phone calls, and text messages relating to coaching and meeting with college recruiters.”

All the coaches’ declarations also influenced the court’s thinking. It is the culture of high school athletics for the coaches to consider themselves as volunteers, Davis wrote.









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Friday, April 08, 2011

Breathalzyer Case Remanded for Burping Driver

Article from VLW:

Breathalyzer Case Remanded for Burping Driver

By Deborah Elkins
Published: April 8, 2011

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The trial court erred in failing to determine if defendant’s burping made him physically unable to take a breathalyzer test; a remand is required to determine if defendant’s jury trial conviction for second offense DUI in 10 years can stand, the Court of Appeals says.

A university police officer stopped defendant at 1:22 am for speeding and squealing tires. About a half hour later, after defendant was transported to jail to take the breathalyzer test, the test operator instructed him that burping would require restarting the test after a twenty minute waiting period.

Defendant began burping. After the test was restarted three times, defendant was charged with refusal to take the test. Defendant claimed to have suffered over a decade with acid reflux that caused him to belch involuntarily on a daily basis. The officer refused defendant’s request to take a blood test when brought before a magistrate. The trial court twice denied defendant’s motion to dismiss on the basis defendant had no right to either test.

We agree with defendant that the trial court erred in failing to make any finding as to his physical ability to take the breath test. We disagree with the commonwealth that defendant waived this issue. The trial court failed to make any determination on the issue of physical ability. As we said in Brown-Fitzgerald v. Commonwealth, 51 Va. App. 232 (2008), Va. Code § 18.2-268.2(B) imposes an obligation on police who choose to compel submission to chemical testing to provide a blood test if the breath test is unavailable or the defendant physically unable to submit. Defendant has the burden of proof under Hudson v. Commonwealth, 266 Va. 371 (2003). The evidence was conflicting. If defendant was unable to take the breath test, the charges must be dismissed; if he was able, the conviction stands. We remand to the trial court to make this factual determination based on the evidence already before the court.

Packard v. Commonwealth
(Frank) No. 1539-10-2, March 29, 2011, Charlottesville Circuit Court (Hogshire), Graven W. Craig for appellant, Benjamin H. Katz, AAG. VLW 011-7-115(UP), 7 pp.










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Thursday, April 07, 2011

Assembly Overrides Medical Malpractice Veto

Article from VLW:

Assembly overrides med mal veto

April 6th, 2011

The House of Delegates made quick work of Gov. Bob McDonnell’s veto of legislation that would raise the state’s cap on medical malpractice awards from $2 million to $3 million over 20 years.

After barely 10 minutes of discussion, the House overrode the veto this afternoon on a 93-7 vote, even more one-sided than the 89-7 vote by which the House adopted House Bill 1459.

The vote was closer on the Senate’s version of the measure, Senate Bill 771. The Senate overrode the veto by 29-11 on its bill. Both houses then had to vote on the bill from the other house, and the Senate overrode the veto on the House version by the same vote. The House vote on the Senate measure was 92-6 to override the veto.

The Medical Society of Virginia, the Virginia Hospital and Healthcare Association and the Virginia Trial Lawyers Association reached a compromise on the cap after two years of negotiation. They did so under a threat from the chairmen of the House and Senate Courts of Justice committees that the legislature might take action neither side would like.

Once they reached the compromise, the organizations lobbied forcefully for its passage, before and after the governor’s veto.

McDonnell said he vetoed the legislation because had campaigned against it in his race for governor.

Two budget amendments that also affect the legal system were killed. The House rejected on a 50-50 vote an amendment that the Virginia State Bar viewed as an effort to micromanage its budget. The amendment would have required the VSB to develop a plan to ensure that revenues are within 10 percent of expenditures and limit working capital balances to an amount that would cover three months of operations.

Read literally, VSB Executive Director Karen A. Gould said, the amendment didn’t take into account that most of the bar’s annual revenue is collected at one time so that its revenues far exceed three months of operating costs for part of the year but get spent down over the budget cycle.

In his 2011-12 budget, McDonnell had proposed taking $5 million from the bar’s operating reserve, but the legislature rejected the proposal.

The House approved the second amendment, which requires circuit judges to report to the Virginia Criminal Sentencing Commission when they defer judgment in the first instance and again at the conclusion of the case, on a 79-20 vote, but the Senate rejected it, 26-14. The amendment did not apply to laws, such as those involving first-time drug offenders or domestic assault, for which the legislature has already allowed deferred judgment.

Vetoes can be overridden only a two-thirds vote of each house. Budget amendments can be defeated by a majority vote in either house.

The amendment is a response to Hernandez v. Commonwealth, a decision by the Supreme Court of Virginia earlier this year that says judges have the authority to defer disposition of a criminal case and ultimately dismiss it. An effort to overturn the decision legislatively passed the House but failed in the Senate with a recommendation that the Virginia Crime Commission study the issue.










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Tuesday, April 05, 2011

Husband Gets Wife's Life Insurance, Despite Property Settlement Agreement

Article from VLW:

By Deborah Elkins
Published: April 5, 2011

Although a husband signed a separation agreement waiving any claim to benefits from wife, husband – and not wife’s mother or the estate – can keep life insurance proceeds from the wife’s ERISA-approved plan because she did not change the beneficiary designation before she died, says the 4th Circuit.

The wife worked for Delta Airlines before her untimely death. Her employee life insurance plan allowed her to unilaterally change the designated beneficiary at any time by sending a signed, dated written request to the carrier, MetLife. In the event she failed to designate a beneficiary at the time of her death, the plan made clear that MetLife would disburse benefits to her estate. The plan did not specify any procedure for beneficiaries to follow in order to waive their claims to benefits.

Six years after wife designated husband as beneficiary on the MetLife policy, they separated and a South Carolina family court entered their separation and property settlement agreement, which included a waiver of “the right to receive proceeds, funds or property as a beneficiary under any life insurance policies.” However, wife never changed the name of the beneficiary. MetLife paid the proceeds to husband, and appellants filed suit, and later, this appeal.

Kennedy v. Plan Adm’r for DuPont Savings & Investment Plan
, 129 S.Ct. 865 (2009), seems rather straightforwardly to foreclose appellants’ claims. As in Kennedy, it is undisputed that the plan documents on file at the time of death declared husband to be the primary beneficiary of the plan, as wife never took advantage of her option to designate anew beneficiary.

Appellants’ arguments do not provide any basis for this court to depart from the clear and evident thrust of the Kennedy decision. Nothing in Kennedy authorizes a plan administrator to disregard a validly executed beneficiary designation form where the beneficiary has made no effort to disclaim his right to benefits. Rather, the court wished to give meaning to the plain intent of Congress in 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D); it wished to provide beneficiaries the prospect of prompt receipt of benefits without the benefits of uncertainty; and it wished to relieve plan administrators of the need to divine obscure participant intentions and of the specter of a lengthy fight in court.

We need not rest our ruling on our interpretation of Kennedy, for the 8th Circuit addressed this very issue in Matschiner v. Hartford Life & Accid. Ins. Co., 622 F.3d 885 (8th Cir. 2010). That court reached the same result we reach here: the plan documents, not the divorce decree, are controlling, and footnote 13 of Kennedy only addresses situations where a plan precludes a pension benefit plan beneficiary from disclaiming an unwanted interest. Also, the Secretary of Labor, with considerable enforcement ERISA enforcement authority, agrees with MetLife.

We see no need and possess no authority to unwind em>Kennedy and make a puzzle of plan administration.

Judgment for MetLife affirmed.

Boyd v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (Wilkinson) No. 10-1702, March 31, 2010; USDC at Charleston, S.C. (Houck) Robert E. Hoskins for appellants; Lowell D. Kass for appellee. VLW 011-2-066, 13 pp.










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